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Chapter one 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Introduction: birth and development of an American idea  
 
“Of the many influences on U.S. foreign policy formulation, the role of think tanks is 
among the most important and least appreciated.” 
  Richard Haas, former Director of Policy and Planning, U.S. Department of State, 2002.1
It is not an empty space that divides politics, media, business, but a space 
in which ideas, projects, analyses are the essence of any think tank. A short 
and exhaustive definition, due to the polymorphic nature of these 
institutions, is not simple. Literally, think tanks are organizations of the 
most varied nature that operate as research centres and are intended to 
 
 
 
“There are moments in the evolution of U.S. foreign policy where think tanks have 
had a decisive impact in reshaping conventional wisdom and setting a new course on 
a key strategic issue.” 
 Ronald D. Asmus, Executive Director of Transatlantic Center, 2003. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Richard Haass worked as Director of Policy and Planning for the U.S.  Department of State from 2001 
to 2003.  
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influence the public decision-maker or promote a specific political and 
cultural agenda (see Diletti 2009). According to Rich (2004), think tanks 
are  
 
indipendent, non-interest-based, non profit organizations that produce and 
principally rely on expertise and ideas to obtain support and to influence 
policymaking process. Operationally, think tanks are non profit organizations that 
conduct and disseminate research and ideas on public policy issues. Politically, think 
tanks are aggressive institutions that actively seek to maximize public credibility and 
political access to make their expertise and ideas influential in policy making  
(Rich 2004: 11).  
 
The term 'think tank' is an American invention, used in military jargon 
during the Second World War, with reference to the places where the 
special forces responsible for analyzing the progress of the war used to 
meet as required by the Department of Defense. The choice of the term 
‘tank’, symbolizing a war-like attitude, is not casual, because other labels 
used at that time, with no explicit references to the war, proved to be 
ineffective. 
In 1971, the first analysis of the think tanks by the journalist Paul 
Dickson was published, but only in the '80s and '90s the theme started to 
arouse some interest, particularly in light of the spread of ideological think 
tanks, especially Republican. It was the presidential victory of Ronald 
Reagan in 1980 that enabled the creation of an intellectual conservative 
élite who had access to government positions, but also major newspapers, 
television programs and magazines.  
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Basically, the difference between the first think tanks in Washington and 
those in vogue from the ‘70s onwards is to be found in their respective 
missions: if the former were distinguished by quality and social research, 
careful and scrupulous enough to be referred to as “universities without 
students” (see Abelson 2009), the latter were interested mostly to the 
media, political impact, and results. 
Robert Kent Weaver (2000), from the Brookings Institution (a Democrat 
think tank) has proposed a simple scheme that matches each period with 
the corresponding model of think tank: 
 
1° PATTERN 2° PATTERN 3° PATTERN 
Beginning of XX 
century 
From 1945 to the 60s From 70s onwards  
Research centres, also 
said ‘Universities without 
students’. 
Think tanks focusing on 
research and development; 
more structured and 
specialized than before. 
Partisan think tanks, 
especially after the election 
of Ronald Reagan in the 
80s. 
Table n. 1 The evolution of US think tanks (from Diletti 2009).  
 
The explanation of the spread of specialized research centres to support 
and assist the government action in the so-called progressive age is 
historically plausible, if we consider that it is in this period that the 
construction of American federalism actually took place: the transition 
from a rural republic, which was Jefferson’s, to the industrial age of 
Roosevelt. The changes and the deep crisis, the economic and industrial 
disadvantages accompanied by mismanagement, inefficiency and 
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widespread social turmoil, needed the interpretative work of social 
scientists and pioneers of renewal, social and cultural innovation. The task 
was to promote social, institutional, economic reforms offering solutions to 
the government and citizens, resulting from the activity of extremely 
competent, specialized and therefore incontestable ‘thinking heads’. 
Philanthropists and political reformers, but also businessmen supported  
the new experts in the marketing of ideas, all united by the purpose to 
correct the imperfections of capitalism, while identifying it as the very 
essence of the ‘new American Empire’: the project was to preserve the 
managerial logic of large private enterprise that involved also the public 
apparatus, limiting some distorting effects such as monopolies and 
widespread political corruption. 
Among the most important think tank Americans in the early decades of 
the twentieth century, Diletti (2009) includes: 
• 1907: Russell Sage Foundation, founded by Margaret Olivia Slocum 
Sage, the widow of Russell Sage, with an initial funding of $ 10 million 
aiming to improve the conditions of life and work in the United States 
'America. 
• 1910: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a private non-
profit organization, whose mission is the promotion of international peace 
and cooperation. 
• 1916: Brookings Institution, still considered one of the most important 
Washington think tanks, created with the main objective to rationalize 
public spending and limit the control of the parties. 
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• 1919: Hoover Institution, founded by Herbert Hoover, then President of 
the United States (1929-1933), who proposed the mission of integrating 
government activity and private enterprise, while promoting peace, liberty 
and the guarantees of the American system.2
It is under the presidency of Franklin Delano Roosevelt that the most 
fervent and dynamic period opens and grows: his institutional reforms 
established the legitimacy and function of experts for the formulation of 
public policies as a guarantee. In addition, the Great Depression in 1929 
that hit the U.S. and shook global economy made it necessary the use of 
specialists in government to recover from an economy crash. There started 
what was described by Arthur Schlesinger (1973) a period of “imperial 
presidency”, thanks to President’s ability to address directly to the public 
 
• 1920: National Bureau of Economic Research, created with a mission 
similar to that of the Brookings Institution, although it is currently an 
international network of economists. 
• 1921: Council on Foreign Relations, mainly composed of businessmen 
and political leaders, and created with the aim of studying global problems 
and defining the foreign policy of the United States. 
                                                 
2 To understand to what extent government policies are intertwined with the idea of economic freedom, it 
can be useful to read the way in which Hoover himself stated the mission of the institute in 1959: “This 
Institution supports the Constitution of the United States, its Bill of Rights and its method of 
representative government. Both our social and economic systems are based on private enterprise from 
which springs initiative and ingenuity.... Ours is a system where the Federal Government should 
undertake no governmental, social or economic action, except where local government, or the people, 
cannot undertake it for themselves.... The overall mission of this Institution is, from its records, to recall 
the voice of experience against the making of war, and by the study of these records and their publication, 
to recall man's endeavors to make and preserve peace, and to sustain for America the safeguards of the 
American way of life. This Institution is not, and must not be, a mere library. But with these purposes as 
its goal, the Institution itself must constantly and dynamically point the road to peace, to personal 
freedom, and to the safeguards of the American system” (my emphasis; see 
http://www.hoover.org/about/mission-statement). 
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bypassing the Congress, which should mitigate and control the conduct of 
the government. The centralization of powers and functions within the 
White House was stronger than ever. 
 
 
1.2 Participation, organization, communication strategies: how do 
think tanks work? 
 
Think tanks in the US have a particular interest in controlling the 
relationship with Congress and his staff, administration officials, federal 
judges and representatives of state bodies and local authorities. Mc Gann 
2005 describes two sets of objectives as typical features of U.S. think 
tanks: long-term objectives and short term strategies. Long - term 
objectives include a mediating function between the government and the 
public; the identification and evaluation of current policy issues; the 
interpretation of issues, events and policies for the electronic and print 
media, thus facilitating public understanding of domestic and international 
policy issues (Mc Gann 2005: 3).  
Short-term strategies, instead, are mainly focused on ‘setting the 
agenda’, that is to say to transform ideas and emerging problems into 
policy issues through the construction of issue networks. The provision of a 
supply of personnel for the legislative and executive branches of 
government, as well as the ability to provide direct advice to the 
administration and the Congress (Mc Gann 2005: 4) are the main think 
tanks’ actions that influence public debate. The experts from think tanks 
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regularly attend the meetings of the Congress and sometimes organize 
briefings for individual members of the Congress; on the other hand, 
government officials and members of Congress are invited to take part in 
the events of the think tank in such a way that they can express political 
views or actions of any kind in front of an audience of specialists. 
An on-line registration and a badge pinned on the jacket with the name 
on are the requirements to participate in a think tank’s business day. The 
daily agenda consists of debates, conferences and seminars (often set in 
times compatible with those of business: breakfast, lunch, after 6 pm) held 
by think tanks’ experts, scholars, professors, politicians, members of the 
cabinet, foreign ministers, diplomats (see Diletti 2009; McGann 2005). The 
ultimate goal, regardless of the type of think tank, is to persuade and attract 
the attention of the public, the press, the media, the experts: information 
and its modes of spread are the vital element of a think tank. 
As illustrated by James McGann (2005), from the University of 
Pennsylvania and founding member of the Foreign Policy Research 
Institute, the goal of spreading information is pursued by the think tank 
through a range of different mechanisms: 
- seminars, conferences and briefings, in group or individually, may take 
place in public or open to a small number of participants; they are the tools 
that ensure a profitable interaction between individuals directly, or 
indirectly linked to research centres; 
- publications: even the publishing industry, one of the oldest means of 
communication, are functional to the achievement of the mission of a think 
tank. Magazines, newspapers, monographs, brochures, faxes, emails and 
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newsletters, and more: websites are full of ideas, comments, suggestions, 
biographies of experts, research programs, events and everything that a 
think tank believes as strategic discussion points, aiming to reach the 
general public, or sometimes just part of it;  
- policy papers and policy briefs: the former texts consist of about twenty 
pages, with descriptions rather long and meticulous, for the community of 
specialists in the field of a think tank; otherwise, the latter takes the form of 
documents that illustrate alternative policies and, as a rule, do not exceed 
three-four  pages and have specific reading targets; 
- the media: even television, radio news and talk shows do not seem to 
be able to do without the experts. From CNN to Fox News, NBC and 
through Mnsbc (see Diletti 2009: 64) the participation of think tanks’ 
commentators in television programmes has now reached exponential 
levels. Not to mention that even places like the Brookings Institution and 
the Heritage Foundation have both their TV studios, and some experts from 
the American Enterprise Institute have their own weekly show broadcast on 
U.S. public television station PBS.3
                                                 
3 One of the most famous is Ben Wattenberg, moderator of the weekly PBS television program Think tank 
with Ben Wattenberg.  
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1.3 A taxonomy of U.S. think tanks  
 
It is possible to classify think tanks by means of the organizational 
structure and culture, the type of political or philosophical orientation and 
affiliation with the political apparatus-government (Abelson 1996; Diletti 
2009). Depending on the nature of their political attitudes, think tanks can 
be: Conservatives, Liberals, Centrists, Centrists of Right or Left and 
Progressive. Obviously, this classification is not to be considered as 
exhaustive and clear-cut. In principle, conservative think tanks are 
advocates of the free market; liberal think tanks emphasize the importance 
of laissez-faire in economy, as opposed to excessive government 
intervention policies; social centrists can be regarded as a synthesis 
between conservatives and liberals, and define themselves as detached and 
non-partisan bodies; finally, the progressive think tanks that support state 
intervention in economic policy and, at the same time, limit the action with 
regard to social issues. 
The Department of State, in 2002, included the following think thanks 
and their respective websites as the most representative in the U.S.:  
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Fig. n. 1. The most important think thanks and their websites according to the U.S Department of 
State (2002).  
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However, following Diletti (2009) and Rich (2005), think tanks can be 
classified according to their political approach in six categories, ranging 
from Conservative to Progressive centres:  
 
1. Conservative 
Heritage Foundation  
American Enterprise Institute  
Hudson Institute  
Hoover Institution  
Progress and Freedom Foundation  
Manhattan Institute  
Competitive Enterprise Institute  
Family Research Council  
National Center for Policy Analysis 
 
2. Liberal/Conservative 
Reason Foundation  
Cato Institute 
 
3. Centre – Right 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy  
RAND Corporation  
Center for Strategic and International Studies 
 
4. Centre 
Institute for International Economics 
Milken Institute  
National Bureau of Economic Research 
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Council on Foreign Relations 
Freedom Forum  
Economic Strategy Institute  
Progressive Policy Institute  
Public Policy Institute of California  
Resources for the Future  
Baker Institute 
 
5. Centre - Left 
Urban Institute  
Carter Center  
Brookings Institution  
New America Foundation  
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 
 
6. Progressive 
Citizens for Tax Justice  
Center for American Progress  
Justice Policy Institute  
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities  
Center for Public Integrity  
Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies  
Worldwatch Institute  
Center for Defence Information  
Institute for Policy Studies  
Economic Policy Institute 
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1.4  Right-wing vs. left wing think tanks: aims 
 
“We man the ivory towers as well as the trenches in the war of ideas. We define the 
objectives, devise the strategies, and manufacture the ammunition. The war of ideas 
is a war of words—a war of intellect.  It is a war of great importance… Lenin put it 
this way:  ‘Ideas are much more fatal things than guns.’ ” 
 
“Ideas like Supply Side economics, privatization, enterprise zones, and the flat tax 
are produced by individuals first—the academic scribblers, as Keynes would call 
them. But it takes an institution to help popularize and propagandize an idea—to 
market an idea.” 
 
Selling ideas takes time. Proctor and Gamble does not sell Crest toothpaste by 
placing one newspaper ad or running one television commercial. They sell it and 
resell it every day by keeping the product fresh in the consumer’s mind. 
Organizations like Heritage Foundation sell ideas in much the same manner.”  
 
 Ed Feulner, Jr., former President of The Heritage Foundation, 1986.4
                                                 
4 Ed Feulner was President of The Heritage Foundation from 1977 to 2013.  
 
 
Almost awkwardly, America’s best known conservative think tank 
quotes Lenin. Although Edwin Feulner, former President of The Heritage 
Foundation, despised Lenin’s views on economics, he recognised his 
capacity to properly use ideas and ideology to ground political power. As a 
matter of fact, any political movement relies on think tanks or research 
centres to boost its policies and influence the political agenda.  
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Apparently, the function of think tanks is to provide analysis and 
develop argumentation for political groups and movements. As already 
mentioned in this work, some remarkable examples include the Heritage 
Foundation, American Enterprise Institute, and Manhattan Institute, 
representing different kinds of conservatism; Brookings Institute and New 
America Foundation represent the middle view, while the Center for 
American Progress is a left-wing public policy research and advocacy 
organization representing a center-left or progressive attitude.  
However, not to deny think tanks’ actual relevance on both sides of the 
political spectrum, there are many important differences between those on 
the left and those on the right. Some of these differences have been broadly 
pictured, for example, by Andrew Rich in his article “The War of Ideas” 
(2005a) and especially in his Think Tanks, Public Policy, and the Politics 
of Expertise (2005b), although their distinctive features are still hard to 
tackle, and the politicization of think tanks is becoming a real problem 
(Brodwin 2013). 5
                                                 
5 Foundations’ total spending to support think tanks  exceeds several hundred million dollars per year, not 
to mention private philanthropy as well (especially addressed to right-wing think tanks). It can be easily 
affirmed that think tanks on both sides are quite well funded. For example, it is well known that 
conservative Heritage Foundation revenue in 2008 was $63 million, while, on the left, Center for 
American Progress revenue was $29 million for 2007 (see Brodwin 2013).  
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1.4.1  Basic differences between left and right-wing think tanks 
 
Three remarkable and well functioning aspects of conservative think 
tank organizations should be highlighted, in order to draw a clear 
distinction from progressive centres (see Brodwin 2007; Diletti 2009; 
Lakoff 1997). 
• Promotion: they promote their conservative world view as a mission, 
a moral imperative (see Lakoff 1997); 
• Media and public relations: they invest heavily in promoting their 
ideas, understanding the importance of media relations and creating a 
marketing structure around their marketing;  
• Cooperation: they strategically work with other conservative 
organizations (party, movements, associations etc.) in order to maximize 
their impact as a whole. 
It must be said that not all think tanks on the left and right can be 
included within these criteria. For example, similarly to what happens on 
the right, the Center for American Progress (a progressive centre) was 
founded in 2003 with the goal of building a structure suitable for marketing 
and promotion purposes; likewise, the Institute for Policy Studies, another 
progressive think tank, embraces the mission of “ideas into action”. On the 
other side, not all conservative think tanks promote ideas as aggressively as 
Heritage does.  
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As it comes out from this work, it can be relevant to try and define what 
aspects distinguish left- and right-wing oriented think tanks by 
investigating their mission, which involves a crucial difference between 
investment in the promotion of ideas, more noticeable and predictable for 
right-wing oriented centres, against a substantial investment in the 
production of ideas, which seems a distinctive feature of left-wing oriented 
think tanks. 
 
 
1.5  What's the mission? Truth vs. marketing 
 
Left-wing and right—wing think tanks have so far ‘framed’ their mission 
in fundamentally different terms (see Lakoff 1995). To put it simply, many 
think tanks on the left see their mission as a search for truth. Basically, they 
conform to a university research paradigm. The language which is used to 
spread their word comes from their originating beliefs. Many think tanks 
on the right side, instead, see their mission as crafting arguments to support 
specific policy goals and conservative ideology in general. The paradigm is 
that of public relations “tout-court”. The language is predictably smoother 
and easier to get to the point. 
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Example n. 1: the Heritage Foundation 
 
The conservative Heritage Foundation is an excellent example. As a matter 
of fact, part of the Foundation’s mission statement is very explicit:  
 
“To formulate and promote conservative public policies based on the principles of 
free enterprise, limited government, individual freedom, traditional American values, 
and a strong national defense” 6
“AEI is dedicated to preserving and strengthening the foundations of a free society--
limited government, competitive private enterprise, vital cultural and political 
institutions, and vigilant defense--through rigorous inquiry, debate, and writing”. 
 
 
This mission statement is striking enough, since everything seemingly 
starts from principles and values, not analysis and data. 
A similar mission statement seems to guide another leading conservative 
think tank, the American Enterprise Institute:  
 
7
If duly taking into account Heritage’s mission, then, there is no surprise 
noticing how the Heritage policy papers show very little actual research, if 
research means hypothesis backed up by properly collected and analyzed 
data. Instead, most of their publications often mimic op-eds, to give the 
idea of a more immediate and flexible way of communicate. The principles 
 
 
                                                 
6 http://www.heritage.org/about  
7 www.aei.org 
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in their mission statement are expanded upon creatively to formulate 
arguments for the policies they support, by ruthlessly using any modern 
language at their disposal to reach as much valuable audience in the 
quickest way as possible. As a factual example of that, very often, the 
report titles convey policy recommendations directly, making no mention 
of data, as shown by  the headlines below: 
 
- “The Economic Role of Government: Focus on Stability, Not 
Spending” 8
- “The Max Tax: Baucus Health Bill Is More of the Same” 
 
9
 
The way Heritage mission influences its reports and their delivery tends 
to amplify its effectiveness in two ways: 
 
a) a great deal of Heritage publications serves a dual purpose: in the 
short term, to speed up the specific policy positions they favour; over the 
long term, to reinforce and create a strong consensus  on conservative 
matters. 
b) Heritage output is purposely designed and structured so that other 
participants in the conservative movement (legislators, media 
commentators, leaders of advocacy groups, etc.,) can easily absorb the 
product and use it for their own purposes. It is no surprise, then, to realize 
how the immediate practical utility, deriving from their easier and ruthless 
                                                 
8 http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/09/the-economic-role-of-government-focus-on-stability-
not-spending  
9 http://www.heritage.org/research/factsheets/the-max-tax-baucus-health-bill-is-more-of-the-same  
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way of using communicative means and any type of new language, can 
actually attract more money for their operations.  
 
Example n. 2: Center for Budget and Policy Priorities  
 
Let’s make a comparison between the already examined Heritage 
mission statement with the Center for Budget and Policy Priorities, a major 
center-left or progressive think tank with a $16 million budget. The Center 
is widely respected and committed to outstanding work on a broadest range 
of issues. Its mission is described as follows: 
 
“The Center conducts research and analysis to help shape public debates over 
proposed budget and tax policies and to help ensure that policymakers consider the 
needs of low-income families and individuals in these debates. We also develop 
policy options to alleviate poverty.” 10
                                                 
10 
 
 
Two are apparently the key differences between this mission and 
Heritage’s mission: the lack of a broad statement of liberal or progressive 
political principles, and the emphasis on research as a method of election. 
Accordingly, the reports featured on their home page proudly master a tone 
of factual reporting rather than argumentative support to specific goals.  
For example, some headlines are formulated in the following way:  
 
www.cbbp.lorg/about  
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- “Poverty Rose, Median Income Fell, & Job-Based Health Insurance 
Weakened in 2008” 11
as well as  
 
- “Top 1 Percent of Americans Reaped Two-Thirds of Income Gains in 
Last Economic Expansion”12
 
The reader here is regarded as an active part of the process of 
information acquisition, rather than a mere final addressee of a pre-
customized language. For this reason, there is no need to simplify concepts, 
given as an assumption that anyone who reads the articles published by the 
Center for Budget and Policy Priorities is skilled enough,  thus able to 
understand any type of language if supported by sound data and analysis. 
This material is regarded as true as it is based upon data and analysis; on 
the other hand, it is very difficult that this type of formulations can 
penetrate the news cycle or have an impact on the political agenda. 
 
                                                 
11 http://www.cbpp.org/files/9-10-09pov.pdf  
12 http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?id=2908&fa=view  
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Chapter two 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 A mediated world  
 
In the last 50 years the media influence has grown exponentially with the 
advance of technology; we live in a society that depends on information 
and communication to keep going, and we get those information from the 
media, which are our window on the world outside. 
This has lead to a situation where modern humanity is increasingly 
experiencing a mediated world rather than reality itself: 
 
One of the major features of our current transition into the Age of the Mass 
Communication, then, is that increasingly we are in contact with mediated 
representations of a complex physical and social world rather than only with the 
objective features of our narrow surroundings (DeFleur & Ball-Rokeach 1989: 
259).  
 
We live in a mass mediated society, where electronic media play 
important, often invisible and taken-for-granted roles in our everyday lives. 
Media shape our reality, reconstruct it and continue to present and diffuse 
these reconstructions of reality rather than accurate representations. 
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According to Fowler (1991), “news are not a reflection of reality, but a 
product shaped by political, economical and cultural forces”. It should be 
noted, however, that media in general do not deliberately decide to deceive 
anyone, to manipulate or abuse their audiences. The ethical codes of 
journalism dominate most of the newsmaking process, but there are factors 
beyond the editors and journalists’ control which may trigger arbitrary 
reconstructions of reality. 
The selection process in the media, due to the constraints of limited 
space and time is the first source of such partial and thus distorted 
presentation of reality: not all the events are reported (journalists and 
experts have to decide what is news and which is not) and those who are 
presented are usually “reconstructed” through different means. 
 
 
2.2 Opinions and ideologies  
 
Editorials and op-ed articles are obviously expected to express opinions. 
These opinions are related to the political stance and may vary according to 
the ideological presuppositions behind them. Commonly, ideologies 
influence their opinions, thus having heavy repercussions on the discourse 
structure of their articles. But what do actually mean by ideologies in 
discoursal terms? This concept has been heavy debated, and many 
theoretical approaches have  provided several definitions. 
Van Dijk’ s account (1998, 2003) of ideologies involves three different 
components: 
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A- Social functions. A theory of ideologies must focus on how 
ideologies influence individuals and groups in a societal structure. 
B- Cognitive structures. How are ideologies structured within the 
individuals’ minds and how does it relate with other cognitive 
structures and social representations such as shared values, opinions 
and knowledge and personal and contextual models such as 
experience and intentions on the other hand. 
C- Discursive expression and reproduction. How ideologies 
manifest themselves in social practices (especially text and talk). 
 
Traditionally, ideologies have always been seen as controlling tools 
employed by dominant classes to reproduce and legitimate their power. 
Van Dijk partially refuses this assumption, stating that dominated group 
also need ideologies, e.g. as a basis for resistance; this means that 
ideologies per se are not wrong or right, but rather more or less effective in 
promoting their group’s interests. The main goal of ideologies, in this case, 
is to promote the co-ordination of the social practices of group members 
needed to reach the objective of a social group. Given this general function, 
van Dijk finally agrees on the fact that many ideologies develop precisely 
in order to sustain, legitimate or manage group conflicts, as well as 
relationships with power and dominance.  
In order for ideologies to really influence social practices, it is necessary 
that, somehow, ideologies should be tailored to social functions. In other 
words, what people do as group members should reflect what people think 
as group members and viceversa, in a relation studied in terms of social 
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cognition. Social practices presuppose a vast amount of shared beliefs, 
knowledge, norms, values and ideologies. These values represent the basic 
principles that govern social judgement, that separates the wrong from 
right, the true from false. 
It is not clear how ideologies look like, but many group ideologies 
revolve around a simple polarization: the representation of Self versus the 
Others, of Us vs. Them. In short, We are Good and They are Bad, especially 
when conflicting interests are involved. This basic assumption of positive 
self-representation and negative other-presentation may influence a huge 
amount of opinions that We have against Them in more specific social 
domains; for instance racist ideologies may create prejudices against 
minorities or immigrants in matters of immigration, residence, employment 
or education. To put it simple, the main cognitive function of ideologies is 
to organize specific group attitudes. 
Generally, according to Van Dijk (1998) ideologies reflect the criteria 
that constitute social identity and define the interests of a group: who 
belongs to the group, what we do, why and how, how we relate with other 
groups and what we have. These are all questions which define the 
ideology of a group. Of course, the way members represent themselves can 
be biased when seen from the point of view of others . 
Ideologies, like other social representations of the mind are social 
because they are socially shared, they are a form of general and abstract 
knowledge. Of course, through socialization, members may acquire slightly 
different versions of these social representations and some may have more 
complex ideological systems than others, but this does not necessarily 
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mean that ideologies do not exist. Individuals may belong to several social 
groups, thus having different ideologies, each one influencing the other in 
particular situations; this explains why personal uses of ideologies tends to 
be variable and contradictory in concrete occasions. 
 
 
Mental models  
 
General group ideologies can be expressed directly through discourse, 
for instance manifesting opinions. However much opinion discourse is 
more specific and reflects not only group ideologies, but also personal 
knowledge, beliefs and opinions about specific topics or situations. These 
opinions derive from socially shared attitudes, people’s own personal 
experience and evaluations as they are represented in the so called mental 
models (Van Dijk 1998). 
Mental models represent people’s everyday experiences, such as the 
observation or participation in events, actions or discourse. They are 
subjective and personal; models influence what people think and know 
about specific events, and are fundamental for subjective interpretation. 
People continually ‘model’ the events of their lives, including 
communicative events they engage in or news event they read about in the 
press; they remember these models, although some of them derive from 
their group opinions. Models are the link between social representations, 
including ideologies in one hand, and social practices and discourse on the 
other hand. 
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Mental models represent what people know and think about a situation, 
therefore they control the “content” or semantics of a discourse. Of course, 
since people think and know more than they usually say, we must assume 
that only a part of information from a model is expressed; this is the same 
for opinions: people do not always say or write what they really think about 
a topic. Even the opposite is true, people tend to understand much more 
from a text than what is actually written in it. 
 
 
Context models  
 
It has already been noticed that people form models also through 
communicative events: these so-called context models usually feature the 
overall definition of the situation and the actors involved with their 
respective roles, their aims and so on. Context models represent how 
communication is done, and are important in the production and 
comprehension of discourse.  
 
 
Opinions 
 
Opinions, on the other hand, are evaluative beliefs, that is beliefs that 
presuppose a value and that involve a judgment about somebody or 
something, such as A is bad or B is beautiful, depending on the values of a 
specific group or culture. Evaluative beliefs must be separated from factual 
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beliefs, that involve categorizations which are generally considered true. 
For instance, is the belief “smoking is bad” an evaluative or a factual 
belief? It features a typical evaluative concept (bad) and therefore looks 
like an opinion, but if supported by scientific research it may be seen as a 
fact. 
It all depends on the grounds or criteria of judgement. If these grounds 
only belong to a particular group or class view of the world, then it is 
probably an opinion. However, if the grounds are socially shared and based 
on some kind of knowledge, then it is probably a fact (true or false). Of 
course these grounds and criteria are historically and culturally relative; 
every social group may have its own schemata of truth criteria. 
Opinions and ideologies are often said to represent the truth for specific 
groups of people, but that does not make them factual in our sense. As soon 
as norms and values are involved, they are evaluative and not factual.  
 
 
2.3.  The ideological square 
 
The first thing to do when approaching a text is the analysis of its lexical 
items. Words may be chosen generally to express a value judgement (such 
as using the term “terrorist”), others are often used to express an opinion 
(such as “beautiful”, “dirty”, “intelligent”); others instead may be used 
either factually or evaluatively, according to the system of knowledge 
involved (saying that an environment is polluted may be the writer’s 
opinion or be supported by scientific research, therefore becoming factual). 
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Opinions in text and talk may be expressed in several ways: for instance 
in headlines, structures, graphical arrangements, overall topics and so on. 
Concepts and their expression in lexical items usually combine into 
propositions expressed by clauses and sentences; a word implying an 
opinion does not mean much if we do not take into account the meaning of 
the sentence in which it occurs.  
Propositions are usually analyzed in terms of predicates (actions, 
properties and events) and roles (agent, patient). These basic elements are 
usually modified in several ways. Each of these elements and concepts may 
feature implied opinions. For example, choosing “desperate” instead of 
“cold-blooded” as a modifier for the word “terrorist” implies a less 
negative opinion, suggesting that the terrorist was forced to do it. The same 
effect may be obtained by choosing other modalities, such as “they were 
obliged to...”. This use of necessity modalities is quite frequent in text or 
talks that try to limit the negative impact of actions of the We group. 
Moreover, it is not only the concepts involved in a proposition that may 
express opinions, but also the structure of the proposition itself. Usually, 
people’s actions appearing in the Agent role are emphasized, because of 
this prominent position in the syntactic structure of a sentence. Viceversa, 
passive construction tends to de-emphasize actions of person or groups put 
in the passive role. 
According to van Dijk (1998), there is a general strategy through which 
OUR people tend to appear primarily as actors when the acts are good, and 
THEIR people when the acts are bad; viceversa, THEIR people will appear 
less as actors when the acts are good and OURS when our actions are 
32 
 
negative. This strategy of polarization (positive in-group description vs. 
negative out-group description) has created a four-point evaluative 
structure, which we may call the ‘Ideological Square’:  
 
-Emphasize our good properties/actions 
-Emphasize their bad properties/actions 
-Mitigate our bad properties/actions 
-Mitigate their good properties/actions  
(Van Dijk 1998: 33).  
 
This strategy may be expressed in the choice of lexical items, as well in 
the structure of whole propositions and their categories. Opinions are not 
always directly expressed in a proposition, but they also may be implied. 
This means that from a basic proposition, there is a n number of meanings 
that may be inferred on the basis of an event model or context model. 
Moving on to the proper discursive level of sequences of propositions, it 
has to be noticed that events may be described at various levels of 
generality or specificity, and with a complex or simple structure of 
propositions at each level. 
According to the ideological square, we may expect OUR good actions 
and THEIR negative ones to be given more importance, with many detailed 
propositions. OUR bad actions and THEIR good ones instead, if described 
at all, will be expressed in a “detached” way and without giving much 
detail. 
Another important condition of textuality is coherence, that is the 
property of sequential sentences in text and talk that defines why they form 
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a unity and are not put together arbitrarily. According to van Dijk (1998), a 
sequence of sentences is coherent if a model can be constructed for it. This 
may involve causal or conditional relations between the facts as 
represented by a model; coherence is both relative and referential: it is 
defined according to relations between facts in a model which is referred to 
or talked about. 
Strategies of positive self-representation and negative other-
representation may be also applied at the micro-level of sentences. One 
clause may express a proposition that realizes one strategy, while another 
may realize the other; this is the case of disclaimers (“I have nothing 
against you, but...”). In these semantic moves, also known as Apparent 
Denial, the speaker emphasizes his tolerance in the first clause, while 
saying negative things in the second clause. The same schemata can be 
applied for Apparent Concessions (“There are also intelligent southern 
people, but...”), Apparent Empathy (“I know it’s hard, but..”), and so on 
(van Dijk 1998). 
These strategies are used to manage opinions and impressions, that is 
what the listener/reader will think of us. The objective of disclaimers is to 
put a strategic preface to the negative part of our discourse, to avoid being 
considerate intolerant or racist, for instance. 
Another important concept related to the notions of ideologies and 
opinions is the “position”; that is the point of view, the perspective of the 
speaker from which events are evaluated. This subjective perspective is 
often pointed out by pronouns (we, I), adverbs (here, today) and position-
dependent nouns such us (home, neighbour, sister) among other 
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expressions. Pragmatically, personal perspective is usually expressed by 
locutions such as “in my opinion”, “from my point of view” etc. The plural 
forms of these expression may indicate the membership to a social group. 
 
 
2.4  Political discourse in the media 
 
The objective of some works by Norman Fairclough works (especially 
Fairclough 1995, 1998, 2003) is to set out an analytical framework for 
investigating political discourse in the contemporary mass media. The 
political discourse is seen as an order of discourse, that is:  
 
a structured configuration of genres and discourses associated with a given 
social domain which is constantly changing according to the wider processes of 
social and cultural changes which are affecting the media and any other social 
domain linked to them (Foucault 1970)13
                                                 
13  From M. Foucault, The Order of Discourse, 1970, cited in Shapiro M., Language and Politics, Oxford, 
Blackwell, 1984, p. 113-4. 
. 
 
The first issue that Fairclough faces in his studies is the delimitation of 
what can be considered political or not. Fairclough uses a characterization 
of politics as an interaction of different societal systems, as suggested by 
Held (Held 1987): the political system, the social system and economy. The 
nature of politics in different times and places relates to the way these 
systems interact. 
35 
 
In a discourse perspective, the shifting nature of politics can be 
expressed in its shifting articulations of orders of discourse. Contemporary 
political discourse articulates together orders of discourse from the political 
system, science, media and technology, ordinary private life and so on. 
In expressing this, Fairclough refers to Bourdieu’s insight that the 
political discourse is doubly determined (Bourdieu 1991): it is internally 
determined by its position in the political structure and externally by its 
relationship to fields outside politics. 
In terms of Critical Discourse Analysis, the power struggles to achieve 
hegemony in two ways: 
-internally, within the order of discourse of the political system in the 
articulation of the different discursive practices; 
-externally, in the articulation of different systems and orders of 
discourse; the struggle for hegemony is a struggle between political parties 
and political tendencies.  
In short, the external struggle for hegemony is a fight between 
professional politicians and other social agents in fields which collide with 
politics: think tanks experts, journalists in the mass media, grassroots 
activists in social movements etc. 
It is essential, for the comprehension of Fairclough’s framework, the 
identification of the main categories of agents which figure in mass media 
politics. 
Professional politicians and journalists are the first that come to mind. 
Another category is that of ‘experts’, that we will consider in the next 
chapter: political analysts, academics, political scientists. Then we have 
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economic agents (employers, trade unionists) and also ordinary people, 
who recently have started to play a bigger part in political conversations 
and debate in audience discussion programs. All these agents are 
potentially protagonists and antagonists in a struggle for hegemony in the 
media, and also potential allies of course. 
To operate successfully in the media, agents must learn to use the 
discourses and genres of the media. Media genres involve a complex 
mixture of genres taken from other domains (such as the political debate) 
which are re-contextualized within the media. Audience programmes such 
as The Oprah Winfrey Show combine three different genres, only one of 
which is political: debate, romance and therapy (Livingstone 1994). 
In short, Fairclough’s framework for the analysis of the political 
discourse can be summarized by answering to six questions: 
1- Who are the political agents involved and what genres, 
discourses and ethos are drawn upon? 
2- How are they articulated together? 
3- How is this articulation realized in the forms and meanings of 
the text? 
4- How are the resources of the order of discourse drawn upon in 
the management if interaction? 
5- What particular direction does this type of discursive event 
give to the articulation of the political order of discourse? 
6- What wider social and cultural processes shape and are shaped 
by the way this discursive event articulates genres, discourses and 
ethos? 
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The value of this approach is that it avoids particular discursive events to 
be treated in isolation from the orders of discourse and the wider social 
fields and processes they are embedded within. 
 
 
2.5  What is news? 
 
What is news? Bignell (1997) suggests that: 
 
news is not just facts, but representations produced in language and other signs 
like photographs (Bignell 1997: 81).  
 
The newspaper is just one medium of news communication; other media, 
exploited by U.S: think tanks, include television, radio, magazines, and the 
Internet. 
The answer to this question may seem obvious: news is what is new, it is 
what is happening. In the dictionary, news is defined as: a report of recent 
events or previously unknown information14
1 A (TV or radio) program type in which news items are presented. 
. 
According to van Dijk (1988) news can be seen as new information or as 
a news article, but also as a TV program in which news is presented; in 
other words the term news implies the following concepts: 
 
1 New information about events, things or persons. 
                                                 
14 Taken from online Merriam-Webster, on www.m-w.com.  
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2 A news item or news report, i.e., a text or discourse on radio, on TV or in 
the newspaper, in which new information is given about recent events (van Dijk 
1988). 
 
According to van Dijk then, news may refer to a news item in the 
physical sense or to the content and meaning of such an item; to the whole 
discourse including its physical shape or to its semantic nature of 
information as given by the media. 
 
2.5.1   The structure of news 
 
Thematic structures 
 
The first thing to analyze in news discourse is its thematic organization, 
that is everything involving the concept of topic or theme. The topic is, 
generally, what the discourse is about; it does not relate to a single word or 
sentence, but belongs to the global level of discourse, it is a semantic 
macrostructure (van Dijk 1972). 
In the press, topics may be signaled by the headlines, which apparently 
act as summaries of the news text. They define the overall situation and 
indicate to the reader the preferred overall meaning of the text. 
The topics of news discourse are not simply a list; they are instead 
hierarchically organized according to a coherent structure, i.e. their 
relevance. In other words, antecedents of news events may be expressed 
later in the text, while the main event is introduced earlier, in the headline. 
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This concept goes by the name of the top-down principle of relevance 
organization in news: 
 
News discourse is organized so that the most important or relevant information 
is put in the most prominent position, both in the text as a whole, and in the 
sentences. (van Dijk 1988.) 
 
This means that for each topic the most important information is 
presented first with further specifications, while earlier topics are 
reintroduced later providing more details. 
Readers will get the salient information immediately, and partial reading 
will result only in missing a few, lower-level details. Top-down 
organization of the topics allows editors to cut the final paragraphs of a 
news story without the loss of essential information. 
 
 
News Schemata 
 
News discourse has its own global structure in which topics and themes 
are inserted and organized. This structure can be defined in terms of a 
schema based on rules and categories, which may be specific for particular 
discourse types and vary according to society and culture. 
For instance, stories generally present the narrative categories of: 
Summary, Setting, Complication, Resolution and Coda (Labov & Waletzky 
1967). 
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According to Van Dik (1988), news discourse has its own peculiar 
categories. For instance, every item in the press has a Headline, and may 
have a Lead; both these elements precede the others in a text and serve as a 
summary of news. Another common category in news discourse is that of 
Background. Usually Background follows later in a text, that is after the 
category of Main Events; it is the description of the history behind the 
Main Events and must not be confused with the category of Context, which 
provides information about the actual situation. The Previous Events 
category is used instead to remind the reader about something which has 
happened recently; of course the differences between these categories are 
signaled by adverbs and different verbs and verb tenses. 
Another common category is that of the Consequences, which refers to 
the effects of the events; within it, a peculiar case is that of Verbal 
Reactions, which consists in the comments of opinions leaders and allows 
the journalists to formulate opinions that are not necessarily their own. 
Verbal Reactions are signaled by names and roles, and by direct or indirect 
quotations. 
Finally, some news item features a Comment, that is the direct or 
indirect evaluations by the writer on the matter; Comments category 
consists of two major subcategories: Evaluations and Expectations. 
Evaluations feature the evaluative opinions about the actual news event, 
Expectations formulates possible consequences of the actual situation and 
predictions. 
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News Discourse Style 
 
Style of news reports in the press is controlled by its communicative 
context; that is the written discourse of a printed text. The journalist never 
addresses directly to the reader (there is no “you” in the press, for instance). 
Moreover news is a public discourse; this presupposes that our message is 
addressed to an audience which shares with us some knowledge, beliefs, 
norms and values.  
News discourse is also impersonal; it is not produced and expressed by a 
single individual, but by institutional organizations, public or private. The 
writer is only a mediator of the facts, a, impartial observer (of course this is 
not the case of editorials). Clearly, underlying attitudes and beliefs may 
appear indirectly in the text in many ways (in the selection and elaboration 
of topics, for instance), but the main goal is always to be as impersonal as 
possible. 
News style is also related to the nature of topics; in general the report of 
a sport event tends to be less formal compared to a hard news about foreign 
politics.  
Finally, news production process involves some common stylistic marks: 
deadlines require fast writing and editing, thus we may expect fixed 
patterns of sentences used to describe recurrent properties of news events. 
There are also space constraints which necessitate a compact writing style; 
sentences are packed with as much information as possible, while full 
propositions are often condensed through nominalizations.  
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Another peculiar feature of news style is the use of active and passive 
sentences, and the agent or subject position of news actors in the sentences, 
which somehow reveals the newspaper’s implicit stance towards these 
actors. Actors such as authorities who did something negative are often 
placed in a passive position, not as agents, thus making their role in the 
matter appear less relevant. 
Finally, the choice of words in news discourse is another important 
marker of the style. Words reflex the relationship between speech partners, 
the attitudes and ideologies of the speaker; there is a huge difference, for 
instance, between terrorist and freedom fighter. 
 
 
Rhetoric of News Discourse 
 
Rhetoric, like style, is related to the way we say things. But, while style 
is directly influenced by the context, rhetoric depends on the goals and 
intended effects of communication, its objective is to bring the reader on 
our side, to persuade him that our reasons and beliefs are right. 
Persuasion in news discourse involves that not only the reader must 
accept our speech as news, but he also must accept it as the truth or at least 
a possible truth. Readers have to believe in what the newspaper says. Of 
course this requires a minimum coherence with the beliefs and values that 
the reader already has; a text can persuade us only when it already assumes 
a point of view which is similar to ours, explicitly or implicitly. 
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Content of news needs to be noticed, understood, represented, memorized, 
believed and integrated by the reader. (van Dijk 1988). 
 
To promote the persuasion process, news discourse applies several 
strategies (see Tuchman, 1972), such as: 
-Emphasize the factual nature of events;  
-Build a strong relational structure (i.e. putting events in a cause-effect 
relationship);  
-Provide information that have an attitudinal and emotional dimension. 
Attention to ‘hard’ news, violence, sex and scandals satisfies the rhetoric 
of emotions and covers the majority of what in the Western countries is 
consumed as news. 
To persuade readers, journalists also try to get first-hand evidence from 
their correspondents or reporters; after all, the direct observation is the 
ultimate warranty of truthfulness. Similarly, eyewitness reports in an 
interview for instance, may be used as a necessary substitute of the 
reporter’s own observations; their words tend to be taken as the truth by the 
readers. 
Another common tool in news discourse rhetoric is the quotation of 
sources: these sources are hierarchically organized (a public authority is 
seen as more reliable compared to a bystander) and are supposed to 
indicate the truth of the facts; moreover they protect the journalist from 
slander and libel and give him the opportunity to introduce opinions 
without abandoning his characteristic neutral stance (journalists cannot 
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express directly their opinions, but can introduce those of the new actors 
who share their point of view). 
Finally, another common rhetoric tool to suggest truthfulness is the 
employment of precise numbers in a text. Numerical indications signal 
precision in a report and are hence a warranty of reliability. 
We may conclude that news rhetoric involves not only the use of the 
ordinary figures of speech, but also strategic devices that enhance 
truthfulness, plausibility and precision. 
 
2.5.2 News production 
 
News production is about the production and writing processes of news 
texts.  
It is not yet well known how a source text gets transformed into several 
final versions of a news text; how the processes of source text 
understanding, representation and summarization take place and how this 
information is used in the processes of news production. 
 
 
Interpretation of events  
 
Most news is based on sources such as texts and talk, but sometimes it 
may also be based on the news events in their own right. One central 
question is to determine when an event is considered a news event, thus 
having news value. It is usually assumed that if an event matches the 
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criteria of news value known by the journalist, then it has a higher chance 
to be selected as a potential news event. 
As a result from monitoring an event, the journalist creates a socially-
monitored mental model of the situation in his memory; this mental model 
is the basis for the production of a discourse, and hence, news. 
The reporter needs to retrieve as much information as possible about the 
event, information which will be stored into his memory according to a 
hierarchical organization mediated by the implicit news value criteria; e.g. 
an air crash is more newsworthy than a bank robbery, which in turn is more 
newsworthy than a scratch on a car. Newsworthy events are higher in the 
hierarchy, are represented with higher details and have a better chance of 
being used in news production. 
Not all the events have the potential to become news events. Journalist 
must filter them according to a various range of concepts such as public 
interest, difference, non-routine, size, negative consequences and so on. 
Moreover, news events are constrained to their time, location and actors. 
Time is essential due to the deadlines of journalism, location requires 
accessibility and actors relate to a schema which involves accessibility, 
political and social power, visibility or simple participation in highly 
negative or spectacular events.  
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Processing source texts 
 
Most news, however, is not based on direct observation of events, but 
derives its information from discourse. We should distinguish between 
discourses which are itself news events, such as declarations from 
politicians, and discourses that are only used for their information content, 
not for the news value of the communicative event in which they were 
produced. 
Discourses as news events must be accessed, observed, interpreted and 
memorized just like any other action, yet they are a pre-formulated 
information, which already contain opinions and ideologies of the speaker 
and thus the reporter’s objective, in this case, is to copy the source 
discourse through the use of quotations. 
The same happens for discourses which are not news events; portions of 
the text may be selected, copied, quoted or summarized. 
The first resource for processing source texts is selection. The choice to 
select one item instead of another may be based on reading and evaluation 
or be made a priori, according to the credibility or authority of the source 
(between a police report and a bystander eyewitness, the journalist will 
always choose the first one). 
Once a part of a source text has been selected, the literal reproduction of 
it is by far the easiest strategy: copying large parts of agency dispatches 
with a slight change of style is a fast way to produce news, especially when 
there are no other sources available and we have little knowledge of the 
news event. 
47 
 
Another major strategy is the summarization: this strategy revolves 
around the three concepts of Deletion, Generalization and Construction. 
Deletion applies to the local information which is no longer necessary, 
Generalization occurs when similar properties are relevant for a group of 
actors or when a given property can be applied to different members, and 
Construction requires the combination of several micro-events into an 
overall macro-event. 
Of course summarization is a subjective process, which presupposes 
personal decisions on which is important and which not. 
Summarization takes place at every stage of the source text and news 
text processing and allows the journalist to reduce large text in shorter text, 
define the most important information, compare different sources and 
reduce the information complexity, thus being a powerful tool for the 
design of the final article. Journalist may not only summarize a source text, 
but also transform it, replacing words, sentences or paragraphs with 
comparable fragments of another text.  
This may be done through: Deletion of controversial information, which 
will be replaced by the one provided by a more reliable source; Addition of 
other elements taken from other texts, Permutations (a change in the 
structure of the source text, with the most relevant information moved up) 
and Substitution of items with others provided by other sources. 
Transformations of the text can also be merely stylistic or rhetorical: 
style change is an effective way to express personal opinions or ideologies 
in the text while writing about the same events and rhetorical 
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reformulations allow the reporter to make a story more effective and 
entertaining. 
After all these processes on the source text, the final version may be 
published or edited again, to enhance readability and comprehension or 
may also be completely abandoned in favor of another, more appealing, 
story. 
 
 
News Value 
 
The selection of news value has always been explained in terms of news 
value. There are values about newsworthiness of a discourse or event 
which are shared among the journalists and people working in the industry, 
like think tank experts. 
Accessibility of sources favors stories and news actors which have a 
stable relationship with the press, such as spokesmen and press 
conferences. This explains the special interest for opinion leaders, 
politicians and social elites. This special attention for élite persons and 
groups builds up a vicious cycle in which these actors turn to be dominant 
and journalist on the other hand keep on producing stories about these same 
elites. 
However, according to Van Dijk (1988), there are a number of specific 
cognitive constraints that define news values: 
Novelty: news should in principle be about new events. 
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Recency: not all new information can be turned into news; for the press, 
the event described must be recent, within a margin of between one and 
several days. 
Presupposition: journalist must assume that the reader may not know 
anything about the topic or may have forgotten previous information; 
therefore presupposed information may require a summary of previous 
events to be fully comprehended.  
Consonance: news should be consonant with socially-shared norms, 
beliefs and attitudes. It is easier to understand and accept something that 
shares our opinions and ideologies. News about something which clashes 
with our attitudes has fewer chances to be covered unless it confirms our 
negative schemata about that something and the perspective of the 
description is consonant with these schemata.  
Relevance: information is preferred if it is relevant for the readers. Of 
course there may be different groups of readers, with various interests and 
expectations; usually relevance is related to the interests of the powerful, 
larger groups. Therefore, news meeting these interests will be covered, 
while those against them will be ignored or under-covered. 
Deviance and Negativity: it has been demonstrated that most of the news 
discourse is about negative events such as wars, problems, scandals, crime 
or disasters. It seems that people are interested in such news, even though it 
is not easy to explain why. Psychoanalytically, these various forms of 
negativity may be seen as expressions of our fears and therefore getting in 
touch with them through the media may serve the purpose to exorcize 
them, as a self-defense mechanism. At the same time, this information, 
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especially when it is about a minority group, may serve the purpose to 
confirm the difference in norms and values between our group and the 
outcasts. Of course, negative stories need happy ends to really help us in 
the eventuality of a disaster; thus the special attention in crime news for the 
role of police, for instance. There is always the need for a hero to solve the 
situation, otherwise negative news stories without positive elements would 
be hard to digest. 
Proximity: this point is related to consonance; media messages about 
local events (even in a spatial way, i.e. the events of our hometown) are 
better understood because they are based on models that are more complete 
and available (Kahneman - Tversky, 1973). Moreover, this news may be 
useful for the reader in his/her everyday activities and interactions. 
 
 
2.5.3 News comprehension 
 
News comprehension involves several steps: perception and attention; 
reading; decoding and interpretation; representation in episodic memory; 
formation, uses and updating of situation models; uses and changes of 
general, social knowledge and beliefs (van Dijk 1988; van Dijk – Kintsch 
1983).  
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Perception and attention 
 
This is an obvious requirement for reading and comprehension. 
Adequate understanding of a text requires complete attention on it, since 
any external interference may prejudice our comprehension giving birth to 
misunderstandings.  
Perception involves the ability to identify news items and distinguish 
them from other things such as advertisements, comic strips or stock 
market tables. Perception of a news item is often related to the headline, 
used as a marker capable of drawing people’s attention and identify the 
media source. 
 
Reading 
 
Reading involves the process of decoding and understanding: when we 
read a page we are attentively examining the text, decoding it and also 
trying to interpret its message.  
Reading is based on decisions and knowledge: we may skim through a 
text, starting from the headline, and in any given moment decide that we 
already know enough about the topic and select another article on another 
page; since reading is time constrained, we may assume that most of the 
article are only partially read, thus the usual top-bottom structure of news 
discourse comes in handy. 
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Understanding 
 
Since reading usually starts from the headline, the first step in 
understanding a text is in the decoding and interpretation of headlines.  
Headlines and lead usually provide the most important, necessary 
information of an article; interpreting the headline presupposes a certain 
degree of knowledge and, at the same time, new opinions are formed or 
existing ones are recalled about the events featured in it. 
After the reading and interpretation of the headlines of a news article, the 
control system (of the reader) should feature the following information: 
1. Macrostructure of the context of communication;  
2. Schematic of a news discourse, which allows the reader to recognize 
and evaluate the headlines as a Headline of a news schema in the first 
place;  
3. A tentative semantic macrostructure fragment for the news article;  
4. Macro-structural information about relevant situation models, scripts, 
or other schematic beliefs, such as opinions and attitudes about the denoted 
events and their components;  
5. A partial reading plan, involving the decision to carry on reading, to 
read a little bit, etc. (see van Dijk 1988).  
 
In order to understand a headline, its grammatical structure must be 
analyzed: headlines usually lack articles and verb auxiliaries, and usually 
we must know what they are talking about to fully comprehend the topic. A 
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basic knowledge of foreign politics is required, for instance, to proper 
understand a headline about a political scandal abroad. 
After the headline has been interpreted, it is time to analyze the lead. 
Leads usually provide the specifications of what is not included in the 
headline, thus providing all of the relevant information of the article: time, 
places, actors involved and the other details are often found within it. 
 
Understanding is a complex integrated process of strategic selection, retrieval and 
application of various information sources in the construction of textual 
representations and models. Once we have constructed an acceptable model of the 
situation, we say that a newspaper item has been understood (van Dijk, 1988). 
 
The rest of the text is interpreted by the reader clause by clause, and also 
verifying the causal relations between them, to define local coherence. 
Propositions are ordered through the usual top-bottom schemata: important 
propositions come first, while the lower level details are provided later. 
Moreover these propositions may be related to news schema categories 
such as Main Event, Context, Background or Verbal Reactions. 
 
 
Representation 
 
The result of such a process of understanding of news is a text 
representation in episodic memory, which is the part of long-term memory 
where people’s experiences are stored. These text representations give birth 
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to situation models, subjective representations of the text situation featuring 
general categories such as Time, Location, Circumstances, Participants, 
Actions and Events; for news discourse understanding means most of the 
times the retrieval of such models in memory. These mental models merge 
with pre-existing attitudes and beliefs, thus modifying opinions and 
ideologies or giving birth to new ones. 
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Chapter three  
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Framing the news 
The differences in think tanks’ mission are sharper when we observe 
how major news events are framed. The framing of major news is a critical 
part of promoting and defending a political view. In an interview, George 
Lakoff has explained the concept of ‘framing’ by making clear examples 
and blaming Democrats for never being ready to ‘frame’ the events in their 
own terms:  
 
“Every word is defined relative to a conceptual framework. If you have something 
like "revolt," that implies a population that is being ruled unfairly, or assumes it is 
being ruled unfairly, and that they are throwing off their rulers, which would be 
considered a good thing. That's a frame. If you then add the word "voter" in front of 
"revolt," you get a metaphorical meaning saying that the voters are the oppressed 
people, the governor is the oppressive ruler, that they have ousted him and this is a 
good thing and all things are good now. All of that comes up when you see a 
headline like "voter revolt" - something that most people read and never notice. But 
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these things can be affected by reporters and very often, by the campaign people 
themselves”.15
Whether think tanks on the left should exploit communication languages 
more like those on the right is a complex and open question: the situation 
on the left is quite different. The U.S. conservative movement, in its 
broadest sense, is more pyramidal and structured for message coordination 
and delivery than the progressive movement. The challenge, then, is about 
understanding what works and why. For this reason, left-wing oriented 
think tanks are asked to develop new working solutions for their own think 
tanks, while remaining grounded in their core beliefs and values. 
Progressive or left-of-center think tanks should shift towards something 
new, although not totally dismissing their starting perspective; or they 
would better need a fresher and different institution inside the think tank 
itself, able to exploit  think tanks original intellectual output and, at the 
same time, to fully implement hidden features and capabilities, also 
 
 
Conservative think tanks, Lakoff goes on, are fully and better prepared to 
spring into action and frame news according to the conservative world 
view, in order to exploit the media impact and covertly influence voters 
opinion for the future, whereas progressive or liberal think tanks are 
inclined to hold off until data can be collected to permit a more 
dispassionate and deeply analysis. Thus, they miss the chance to spread its 
more progressive and less biased word. 
                                                 
15 Interview to John Lakoff, UC Berkeley News, 27 Oct. 2003, 
http://www.berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/2003/10/27_lakoff.shtml  
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concerning the necessary use of new technologies and languages that our 
modern era requires (see Lakoff 2004).16
                                                 
16 Lakoff founded in 1997 a progressive think tank, the Rockridge Institute. According to George lakoff, 
its purpose was to study how issues are framed, both conceptually and linguistically, in political discourse, 
and how progressives might frame them more accurately and effectively. It was closed ten years later, in 
2008, apparently for lack of funds (
 
Over the last decade, progressive or liberal think tanks have begun to 
clarify and assert more strongly their core ideas, such as the predominant 
role of government to stimulate the economy, the undertaking role of 
government to regulate the market to prevent abuses and instability, and to 
encourage the kinds of economic activity (e.g. small and local business, 
clean energy) for a better future for everyone, not only for the better offs. 
Progressive think tanks also seem to have been better understood the 
predominance of communication and language, since no idea can spread 
around without a proper communication strategy.  
The conservative movement has achieved the most stunning ideological 
and material victories over the past 30 years thanks to wise exploitation of 
communication tools and “because they've put billions of dollars into it. 
Over the last 30 years their [conservative] think tanks have made a heavy 
investment in ideas and in language” (interview to G. Lakoff 2003). As 
stated before in this work, then, the proper use of any communicative tool 
and language is regarded to be as the most relevant feature for any 
successful political campaign. 
 
http://www.rockridgeinstitute.org).  
58 
 
 
3.2 Think tanks and media influence 
 
Some studies show that media extensively use the writings and 
spokespersons of think tanks, especially conservative, to frame their news. 
FAIR (Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting)17, a liberal watch group, 
regularly reports on how media use think tanks in their presentation of 
news. According to Haas (2004), Michael Dolny, in his annual reports for 
FAIR (1996-1998, 2000-2002), searched Nexis18
Moreover, by examining network television news programs, Soley 
(1992) and Steele (1995) found that some of the so-called ‘expert’ 
commentators were often spokespersons from conservative think tanks. 
Actually, Soley’s investigation (1992) on the analysts selected by network 
television news organizations over two six-week periods (1979-80 and 
, an extensive database of 
newspaper, television and radio news pieces, to count think tank citations 
in the media by ideology: a) conservative/libertarian, b) centrist, or c) 
left/progressive. Dolny reported that in 1995, the news media cited think 
tanks over 15,000 times. By 2001, the number of citations had increased to 
almost 26,000. Each year, conservative/libertarian think tanks were cited 
most often and from two to five times as often as progressive/liberal think 
tanks.  
                                                 
17 http://fair.org/  
18 www.nexis.com 
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1987-88) shows that the vast majority of these ‘experts’ were East Coast, 
white males, former public officials or associated with conservative think 
tanks. During the Persian Gulf War news coverage, Steele (1995) found 
that think tanks, often conservative, accounted for the largest group of 
media experts, accounting for almost 30% of the total.  
Only few researchers have so far described the extent to which think 
tanks have been used by media in their coverage. Spring (2002) is one of 
them, writing about conservative think tanks and the “…frequent 
appearance of their [Manhattan Institute] experts’ names in newspaper 
stories” (Spring 2002: 32), noticing also how, with the strong support of 
conservative think tanks, Chester Finn (Hudson Institute) and Diane 
Ravitch (Manhattan Institute) have… “flooded the market with 
neoconservative opinions about education,”… publishing literally hundreds 
of articles in the professional and popular press as well as books (Spring 
2002: 48). 
Education, indeed, is an issue of paramount importance for conservative 
think tanks, especially the Heritage Foundation. In an AERA (American 
Education Research Association) 19
                                                 
19 www.aera.net 
 presentation, Alex Molnar, directing 
the “progressive/liberal” Education Policy Studies Laboratory at Arizona 
State University, examined in 2001 both the extent and presentation of the 
news coverage of the conservative Manhattan Institute’s evaluation of the 
Florida A-Plus education program by Jay Greene (2001). What is 
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remarkable is that, differently from other similar occurrences, The 
Manhattan Institute report was not subject to peer review.  
Besides, Molnar (2001) found that news media, including USA Today 
and The New York Times would pick up the Manhattan Institute nationally 
distributed press release, habitually mentioning it in 30 news stories and 
commentaries. Of these pieces, apparently 17 were printed without any 
control on the quality of the findings, 10 were printed with rather balanced 
comments on the study’s findings, and only 3 consisted of comments or 
arguments questioning the study. On the contrary, the follow-up critiques 
of the Manhattan Institute report, published in the education journal, 
Education Policy Analysis Archives, were not covered in the mainstream 
press, but only once in Education Week.20
The conclusions that we can draw from this example are that news media 
use conservative think tank writings and materials on education quite 
readily. Molnar’s findings also underlines how news media most often 
depict a conservative think tank’s portrait overstating their academic 
 Actually, the lack of critical 
reporting is disturbing and Molnar commented that…. “the distribution of 
[think tank] policy reports not subject to a peer review process carries with 
it a risk that sound [education] policy may be subverted” (Molnar 2001: 
“Introduction”). 
                                                 
20 Criticism came from two independent follow-up reports by Camilli and Bulkley (2001) and 
Kupermintz (2001).  
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expertise, and understating, instead, their political leanings and motives, 
clearly bending the language to an ideological scope.  
 
 
3.3  How media present think tank reports and spokespersons 
 
Following Haas (2004), the 1997 FAIR report on the language of news 
media related to think tanks also examined how the top four think tanks—
Brookings Institute (centrist), Heritage Foundation (conservative), 
American Enterprise Institute (conservative), and Cato Institute 
(conservative/libertarian)—were identified in the press. Since none of these 
top four were liberal/progressive, Dolny (1997) also examined the top most 
cited liberal/progressive think tank, the Economic Policy Institute (EPI). He 
realized that Brookings and the other three mentioned conservative think 
tanks did not receive any descriptive ideological label. The Economic 
Policy Institute, on the other hand, was regularly identified by its political 
orientation.  
At the same time, when funding sources were given, focusing in this way 
the attention of the citizens on ideological orientation, the 
liberal/progressive Economic Policy Institute was most clearly identified 
and labeled, than Brookings and the three conservative think tanks. Dolny 
(1998) concluded that the news media not only use liberal think tanks less 
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often than conservative ones, but also that they present them in a different 
way. 
Actually, the Economic Policy Institute was the only group scrutinized 
in terms of its funding sources, suggesting that “…even when progressive 
think tanks are allowed to take part in the usually center-right debate, the 
playing field is still not level.” (Haas 2004).  
Another example comes from the reporter Trudy Lieberman, in a study 
of four right-wing policy campaigns entitled Slanting the Story (2000). She 
also concluded that the news media uncritically used and generously 
presented the work of conservative think tanks. Cato Institute’s Policy 
Analysis n. 187, to make another example, presented as research, was not 
even remotely close to social science research; rather, Policy Analysis n. 
187, entitled “Caveat Emptor: The Head Start Scam”, used a “rhetorical 
style of unbridled scorn” (Lieberman 2000: 102) backed mostly by news 
reports and misrepresenting the words of Head Start supporters and turning 
them into criticisms. 21
In addition, Lieberman notes that despite n. 187’s author, John Hood, 
was not qualified to evaluate Head Start (he was research director for the 
John Locke Foundation, a conservative state-policy think tank in North 
Carolina that worked mostly on state fiscal matters), nevertheless, he  
received extensive, supportive coverage in the news media by being 
 
                                                 
21 The Head Start Program is a program of the United States Department of Health and Human Services 
that provides comprehensive early childhood education, health, nutrition, and parent involvement services 
to low-income children and their families. It was launched in 1965.  
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broadly depicted  either in the news media, or through numerous hard news 
and syndicated opinion columns in newspapers across the country, as a 
“researcher,” an “expert,” and “academic” (Lieberman 2000: 108-110). 
Further, the Cato Institute itself was presented as either having “expertise” 
in child development or with such descriptors like “Washington-based 
research organization”, from which readers could not discern Cato’s 
ideological orientation.  
 
 
3.4  Heritage Foundation, a massive media coverage 
 
The study published by Eric Haas (University of Connecticut, Neag 
School of Education) in 2004 entitled “The news media and the Heritage 
Foundation: Promoting education advocacy at the expense of authority” 
helps us to practically demonstrate what has been suggested so far about 
media utilization to create a favorable environment to the pursuing of a 
particular goal, by examining the news media coverage of the Heritage 
Foundation’s education-related documents and spokespersons during 2001.  
Thanks to a search from the Nexis database at www.nexis.com for the 
period January 1 – December 31, 2001, for news entries that concerned 
education and included references to the Heritage Foundation (coinciding 
with the beginning of the presidential term of George W. Bush), it was 
noticed that one hundred fifty-nine relevant entries were found. These 
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entries correspond to every media citation to the Heritage Foundation as a 
source on education.  
A thematic analysis was conducted by coding the relevant entries and 
over 150 different codes were used, including types of news media (e.g., 
general news newspapers, education publications, television news etc.), 
specific news outlets (e.g., New York Times, Business Week, Fox News 
Live), topic (e.g., curriculum and school governance, school choice, 
Heritage Foundation activities), and Heritage Foundation source (e.g., 
names of specific personnel, publications) . In addition, the Heritage 
Foundation website (www.heritage.org) was searched for information on 
the foundation’s media practices, publications, personnel and 
organizational structure. 
During 2001, the Heritage Foundation flooded the United States with its 
views on education. As shown in the table  below, the Heritage Foundation 
was cited by 81 media sources in 159 news items. It was cited in the print, 
television, and radio media on a variety of education topics in both general 
news and opinion formats and was present in the media debate on 
education on average more than once every three days.  
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News Item   Media Sources   
General news 75 General news newspapers 39   
Op-ed 71 Television programs 13   
Personnel 11 Policy publications 9   
Event calendar 2 News wire services 7   
  Business publications 6   
    Radio programs 4   
    Education publications 3   
Total 159 Total 81   
Table n. 3 - Heritage Foundation Media Presence Related to Education, 2001 (from Haas 2004).  
Haas (2004) found also that  the Heritage Foundation personnel were 
granted 15 opinion bylines and were television or radio guests on 17 
occasions. Of the 15 bylines, eight were in the Washington Times, while the 
remaining seven bylines occurred once each in seven different newspapers. 
In its citations, the Heritage Foundation presented its views on eight 
general topics encompassing 42 subtopics. The topics included such 
commonly debated issues as school choice , testing and education 
spending, as well as issues on private-public partnerships in school 
construction. Almost half of the citations were in editorial and opinion 
formats. 
 
 
3.5     Opinions, syndicated columns and experts without expertise 
 
Another example of the Heritage Foundation strategy is the Heritage 
Foundation opinion piece entitled “Look Who’s Supporting School Choice 
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Now”, by Jennifer Garrett22
- “Hypocrisy on School Choice”, The Deseret News (Salt Lake City, 
UT) on April 27th;  
. According to Haas (2004), Jennifer Garrett 
argued that “…many members of Congress were hypocrites on vouchers 
because they were sending their own children to private schools while 
opposing voucher legislation and thus denying many parents this same 
opportunity.”  
Garrett’s opinion piece was distributed nationally by: Scripps-Howard 
News Wire, April 26, 2001, as “Hypocrisy on Vouchers.” Over the next 
two weeks, the article appeared as :  
- “Hypocrisy Rife on School Choice”, The Chattanooga Times/Free 
Press on April 29th;   
- “Hypocrisy on School Vouchers”, The Washington Times, May 8th.  
In addition it was cited, on May 27th, in a Washington Times opinion 
column entitled “Children yes, Unions no.” 
In three of the articles, Jennifer Garrett was described as “a domestic 
policy researcher for the Heritage Foundation” and one article did not tell 
who she was. The Heritage Foundation was only listed as the “Heritage 
Foundation,” without any details on its political characterization. 
Haas (2004) mentions other examples in which Heritage Foundation 
spokespersons’ citations were used to support the opinions expressed in 
                                                 
22 http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2001/04/look-whos-supporting-school-choice-now 
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two syndicated columns. In April 2001, syndicated columnists Michael 
Kelly and Cal Thomas wrote about the problems of U.S. public schools and 
claimed that the recently released National Assessment of Educational 
Progress (NAEP) scores demonstrated that federal education programs 
were generally a failure, that hurt, not helped, the poor. They quoted the 
Heritage Foundation’s Krista Kafer and Stuart Butler to support their 
theory. Although , unfairly enough, both Krista Kafer and Stuart Bulter 
were named only mentioning their membership to the Heritage Foundation, 
but their respective competence on the subject was not included.  
Despite their impact on a huge amount of population, now convinced 
that part of the program of Clinton administration on education was a total 
failure, these articles provided virtually no information for the reader to 
discern the quality of these statements or the expertise of these opinion 
makers. It is really remarkable, though, the fact that a reader would never 
know from the descriptions of Jennifer Garrett, Krista Kafer, and Stuart 
Bulter that none of them has ever studied or worked in education. This 
aspect of the news media presentation of Heritage Foundation sources—a 
case of ‘bias by omission’ (Baker 1994) —must be underlined to better 
understand the relationship between think tanks and media and language 
manipulative phenomena (see Herman – Chomsky 1998).  
Therefore, it come as no surprise that, thanks to Heritage Foundation 
generous media characterizations of their expertise, the always mentioned 
Krista Kafer - the Heritage Foundation’s most cited source on education-, 
presented a) on the Heritage Foundation web page as an “expert on 
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education” and a “senior policy analyst, education” with “expertise [in] 
school choice, education standards and testing, charter schools, [and] 
federal education programs and b) in news media, during 2001, in the same 
terms, as an “education analyst”, a “policy analyst” or “of the Heritage 
Foundation”, without explaining the derivation of this title or her 
qualifications. 
Reviewing the staff biographies on the Heritage Foundation website, it 
appears that their so called “experts in education” - Krista Kafer, Stuart 
Butler, Robert Moffitt, Michael Franc, and Kirk Johnson have never 
studied or worked in education.  One “expert in education,” Thomas 
Hinton, has a B.A. in political science and Christian education and no work 
experience in education. Megan Farnsworth, probably, was the Heritage 
Foundation’s most qualified “expert in education.” According to her 
Heritage Foundation biography, she worked as a teacher, curriculum 
specialist and school evaluator, and she held a master’s degree in education 
from UCLA and an unspecified degree from Harvard’s Graduate School of 
Education.  
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3.5.1  Research and scientific legitimacy 
 
During 2001, the media presented Heritage Foundation publications as 
an example of sound social science research conducted by qualified 
experts. Among Heritage Foundation publications mentioned by the news 
media, at least ten of these were called “Backgrounders.” Obviously, the 
Heritage Foundation website was far from rendering a full description of 
what the Heritage Foundation intends a “Backgrounder” to be. Ricci 
describes them as …: “essays, thoroughly researched and fully footnoted, 
[that] were usually written in six to eight weeks but could be produced if 
necessary within days” (Ricci 1993: 161). On the other hand, the Heritage 
Foundation describes a “Backgrounder” as a… “general recommendation” 
publication, whereas the media, in contrast, described a “Backgrounder” as 
a “report” or “study”, so implying  them to be more scientific and 
“objective” than either “essay” or “general recommendation.”  
Therefore, Haas (2004) concludes that, referring to the period of  2001, 
the Heritage Foundation was cited:  
1. regularly and often; 
2. in print, television and radio news sources across the country 
3. through Krista Kafer, who was presented as an education expert without 
disclosing her lack of expertise; … 
4. almost without criticism. 
 (Haas 2004)  
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This resulted in a news image, created by manipulating or somehow 
‘bending’ media language, that enhanced the Heritage Foundation’s 
presentation of itself as a think tank always producing ‘objective’ and 
‘scientific’ research.  
 
 
3.6 The war of ideas 
 
Indeed, the Heritage Foundation was created to promote conservative 
values and ideas. In fact, by spinning marketing strategies and language  
over sound  research policy, it has aggressively promoted publications and 
“experts” with quite little expertise to policy makers and the news media.  
As it appears from the evidence collected by Haas (2004), both news 
media and internet tools, at least in the area of education, uncritically used 
and presented the Heritage Foundation’s work more than once every three 
days. Moreover, by referring to their work, words such as “study” and 
“analyst” appeared in almost every quotation, although, as we already said 
before, the Heritage Foundation has been described as a driving force in a 
conservative movement, lacking of public policy expertise and 
characterized by poor social science research methods. 
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Haas argues that media used the Heritage Foundation papers during 2001 
because they were a free and convenient source of media-friendly 
resources, having a format usually cut out purposely to meet the 
requirements of the news media and a language suitable to emphasize 
marketing over subject knowledge. However, this is not to say that the 
news media were not or should not have been aware of the Heritage 
Foundation’s objectives and lack of expertise concerning education. In fact, 
for more than 15 years, it has been widely known that the Heritage 
Foundation, among the others, has been a marketer of conservative ideas 
and that some of its experts and research publications are rather suspect. 
Thus, it appears well-known that Heritage Foundation spokespersons are 
not experts in their subject areas. The quote from Soley (1992) strikes the 
concept once more :  
 
Among [Washington, DC] beltway think tanks, Heritage [Foundation] associates 
have the weakest scholarly credentials . . . Of  its 34 permanent ‘fellows, scholars, 
and staff’ members, only 7 have Ph.D.’s. None are renowned scholars in their fields. 
(Soley 1992: 60). 
 
It is well-known, anyway, that the Heritage Foundation is mainly a 
conservative advocacy organization (see Weaver - McGann 2000). Its 
mission is a “war of ideas”, no matter what, as affirmed in 2000 by Edwin 
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Fuelner, former president of the Heritage Foundation, at the beginning of 
the second Bush administration:  
 
“conservative opportunity and liberal opposition are about to collide like warm and 
cold fronts on a summer’s day, and the probability of thunderstorms is 100 percent. 
This will be a take-no-prisoners war, and there are going to be winners and losers. 
Make no mistake about that.” (Feulner 2000 in Berkowitz 2002).  
 
In this ‘war’ of public policy, expertise in promotion and fundraising, the 
Heritage Foundation operates in the most aggressive way through its 
unlimited use of the media and new language.  
Davis and Owen (1998) provide the strongest condemnation of the 
media use of think tanks in news coverage. They contend that:… 
“segments of the news media—the new media outlets—consciously 
manipulate the news by selecting bits of pre-packaged news disseminated 
by advocacy groups like conservative think tanks that they can use to create 
news-like populist entertainment” (Davis and Owen 1998: 42). The new 
media outlets exploit conservative think tanks for their populist 
entertainment, because they provide free, ready-to-use, and engaging 
material on social and political issues.  
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3.7 Explaining the think tank - media relationship 
 
Given some based-upon –facts- explanations for the use of right wing 
think tanks as sources of information — conservative journalist 
predisposition, corporate media economic interests, and journalistic culture 
favoring conflict and balance — the predominance of right or left think 
tanks opinion in media world must be attributed to their different approach 
towards the utilization of communication tools. 
According to Allan (2000), “journalists are not propagandists” who 
intentionally misrepresent the news; rather “it is the culture of routine, day-
to-day interactions within specific news institutions” (Allan 2000: 60-61). 
Therefore, conservative think tanks seem to have that ‘new’ expertise 
desired by the current news culture.  
As Steele (1995) demonstrated by interviewing a number of prominent 
television news producers, their expert selection resulted from some criteria 
completely different from scholarly or ordinary standards. One criterion is 
“operational bias,” namely  the capability of an  expert to make 
….predictions, and comment on players, and policies”, and whether they” 
look good on TV and videos”. These characteristics included also whether 
the expert had….“already been quoted in the New York Times or 
Washington Post”, and whether the expert has… real world experience as 
opposed to book knowledge”. Another criterion is convenience, namely, 
the “proximity of an expert to a network studio”. Conservative think tanks, 
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with their emphasis on marketing ideas through any kind of media 
campaigns, can take full advantage of this new expertise (see Steele 1995: 
803-809, in Haas 2004). 
Nowadays, new media outlets are talk radio and television, electronic 
town meetings, television news magazines, MTV, print and electronic 
tabloids, and computer networks, including the Internet, Twitter, Instagram, 
Facebook and any other type of net community and blog or forum which 
has became the main channel of human communication. It must by now be 
admitted that, at different levels, media trigger social “consensus”, mainly 
related to the growing relevance assumed by mass media in our Western 
societies. Political power is intimately related to the use of mass media, 
exploited as a form of power control on the one hand, and legitimacy on the 
other.  
Indeed, media do seem to influence citizens’ dynamic behavior. We are 
already observing the effects of different forms of e-government processes 
in different organizations, even Public Administration. The emergence of 
new technologies and e-democracy marks an important step in the 
evolution of our political life. Examples of political e-campaigns 
represented the first approaches to a new form of communication between 
citizens and politics. The sites created by parties allow us to understand 
their relevance to the campaigns. Today, in few seconds, you can mobilize 
the entire network of your friends on Facebook, and in half an hour you can 
record a video, upload it to YouTube and show it to thousands people.  
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The Obama campaign, for instance, has showed this possibility. He did 
not ask users to be passive, but he accepted and valued their contributions. 
Conservative think tanks and organizations were the quickest to understand 
that these “new media outlets” , although much more dynamic and easy to 
steer, have small staffs and little research support, and therefore necessarily 
have to rely on external interest groups to meet information needs.  
Ricci (1993) states that think tank research is likely to be more helpful to 
public policy construction than academic research. Singling out the 
Heritage Foundation, Ricci writes:  
 
think-tankers contribute to the great conversation because both professionally and 
politically, they tend to take principles seriously. . . Commitment can make a positive 
contribution to the great conversation, for it can encourage fellows to restate the 
conclusions in publication after publication, as the Heritage Foundation and the 
Institute for Policy Studies certainly do. Academic scholars, who may also study 
policy issues, are driven by a pursuit of scientific novelty, which does not permit 
them to repeat their findings again and again, as if they had nothing “new” to say. 
Yet in the larger scheme of things, where political decisions must be worked out in 
an open marketplace of ideas, such repetition can be crucial for inspiring and 
fortifying public opinion (Ricci 1993: 225).  
 
The results of her study and of other scholars, such as Davis and Owens 
(1998), suggested that it is likely that news media’s use and presentation of 
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conservative think tanks (both the new media outlets as well as network 
television news, radio news, newspapers and internet as a whole) now act 
in a manner that goes beyond the criticisms, with reckless disregard for 
readily available information, misrepresenting the conservative think tanks 
that they include in their news reports. 
Haas (2004) believes that what appears most evident is that the news 
media’s use of balanced “he said, she said” reporting as a means to achieve 
the professional standard of objective journalism plays into the hands of 
advocacy think tanks like the Heritage Foundation. 
Judis (2000) states that there is a direct link between the rise of 
conservative think tanks and the news media’s defensive use of balanced 
reporting: 
 
The new think tanks and policy groups created by conservatives and their business 
allies began to overshadow their rivals. The press, on the defensive itself, began 
treating the products of the AEI [American Enterprise Institute], Heritage 
[Foundation], and the American Center [for the Study of Business] with the same 
respect as those of Brookings [Institute], NBER [National Bureau of Economic 
Research], or a university economics department. They accepted the canard that 
different views simply reflected different ideologies and that to be fair, both left and 
right, liberal and conservative, had to be represented. Once this concession was 
made, the conservatives triumphed, because in the late 1970s and 1980s they had for 
more money than their rivals with which to broadcast, publish, and promote their 
opinions (Judis 2000: 172). 
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According to Parenti (1993, 1996), news objectivity is a dangerous 
myth. Parenti (1993) finds that, taking “he said, she said” reporting and 
journalistic objectivity together, news media’s use of balance is 
inconsistent and instead promotes social inequality, by favoring members 
of the corporate business class, like the Heritage Foundation: 
 
If reporters play “dumb and more innocent” than they are, it is in selective ways. 
They may obligingly report whatever politico-economic elites pronounce, be it truth, 
half-truths, or lies, but they instantly resuscitate their critical faculties when dealing 
with dissenters. (Parenti 1993: 54) 
 
Parenti argues that the news media must neither accept biases and 
distortions as inevitable nor strive for unrealistic objectivity. Instead, they 
should pursue a type of investigative reporting that give “exposure to a 
wide range of dissident critics along with the usual establishment 
commentators” (Parenti 1993: 54).  
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3.8.  Bias and language 
 
News media seemingly use conservative think tanks works and 
spokespersons despite questions about their rigor and expertise because it is 
more profitable to do so. It also appears that the news media 
unintentionally present conservative think tank works and spokesperson in 
a generous manner by omission of their clear political leanings and their 
emphasis on advocacy, as well as by accepting scientific descriptions 
without verifying whether this is accurate or not. For the sake of the truth, 
it must be remembered once more that also liberals are not free from bias 
and language “twisted” utilization of any kind. 
Therefore, the most skilled into utilizing new media options is headed to 
the victory, despite its possible partial lack of authoritative and academic 
ground-based research. We need to emphasize the choice of the new forms 
used to convey new contents, new ideas and programs: think tanks 
(especially conservative) have been the first to take over. 
The Obama campaign was the most recent examples of a way of 
exploiting these new forms of communication, even enabling supporters to 
communicate with each other. It was presented not as an electoral 
campaign, but as a movement, whose center was the voter, who made it 
possible by voting the new American miracle. Politics spoke the language 
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spoken by everybody and managed to do it by using social networks and 
the web, making democratic participation approachable by everyone. 
The technology platform allowed the individual volunteer to be the 
protagonist, to act proactively on the territory. And still Obama has to 
confront with the transformation of his supporters and has to come to terms 
with the deep influence of think tanks on his politics. The difference here is 
that many of the most influential liberal groups are new or relatively young. 
These young groups include Business Forward, which attempts to attract 
corporate support for Obama's economic policies; Unity '09, a coalition of 
progressive groups focused on pushing Obama's policy agenda; and 
Organizing for America. There are young left-leaning groups devoted to 
health care (Health Care for America Now), economics (the Center on 
Budget and Policy Priorities), defense (the Center for a New American 
Security) and labor issues (Change to Win). Another group, Common 
Purpose, holds seminars near the White House, bringing together more than 
100 liberal activists with Obama administration aides to debate policy and 
plot strategy.  
Matt Bennett, public affairs director for Third Way, a center-left think 
tank, said the groups amount to “a new intellectual infrastructure” for 
progressives in Washington. The ‘father’ of the new vanguard is the Center 
for American Progress, a think tank founded with three employees in 2003 
by longtime Democratic adviser John D. Podesta, who served as President 
Bill Clinton's chief of staff and ran Obama's transition office. Now with 
180 employees and a $25 million annual budget, CAP has its own lobbying 
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arm, called the Center for American Progress Action Fund; a student-
focused project called Campus Progress; and a political blog called Think 
Progress.  
The ability or inability of political groups to control technology and to 
manage the new language related to it, and especially critical technologies 
in the strategic profile, in each historical period, particularly affects their 
fate. The political sphere today is composed by large parties of the Centre-
Right or Centre-Left that have received the consent of the majority of the 
electorate.  
In this scenario, communication and election campaigns play an 
important role, dictated by the fact that voters are more members on the 
basis of targeted communication strategies, instead of on the basis of 
political programs. The paradigm of professionalization of politics, which 
sees the prevalence of specialized skills and organizational centralization 
and, as with business communication, even political communication tends 
to be managed within headquarters from which all strategic decisions are 
taken (see Palumbieri 2011).  
These decisions are the result of the numerous and various skills. The 
new political communication professionals and think tank members and 
experts can be identified with journalists, advertising and Internet 
consultants, to whom is entrusted the task of “selling” political messages 
and even more political figures as if they were consumer goods; all this 
reinforced by a certain type of journalism, more interested in the “game” of 
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politics than to the substantive issues. And this is the setting defined by the 
so-called “permanent campaign”, which seems  
 
the political ideology of our age. This combines image creation to strategic thinking. 
In the permanent campaign the rule turns itself in a perpetual electoral campaign and 
converts the government into an instrument of support to the popularity of the elect   
(Blumenthal 1980: 32). 
 
The decline of parties and the emergence of new figures, as political 
consultants - to use techniques and technologies more sophisticated than 
ever before - are identified, by Blumenthal, as the two necessary conditions 
in order to start and pursue a permanent campaign. More interesting job to 
do for think tanks. Actually, candidates and parties are permanently 
oriented to building their own image that they want to convey to the media, 
with a lot of tension at the next election, rather than challenge the rivals 
with the construction of a successful policy, or even implementation of 
programs proposed during the campaign. 
We can now distinguish between the concepts of ‘campaigning’ and 
‘governing’. The campaign focuses on making individual decisions related 
to the final outcome, winning the election; while the rule is related to a 
lasting and constant process. Moreover, campaigning is based on the 
contrast with the opponent, while governing is collaborative; and finally, 
“to make campaign” is a process closely related to persuasion, while the 
rule is related to the resolution arising from the consultation (see 
Blumenthal 1980).  
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With the permanent campaign, the governing and campaigning tend to 
get confused, and it is usually common the trend to use, in the governance, 
the tools of the campaign as communications strategies to support and 
‘advertise’ the actions of government, to lay the groundwork for a future 
re-election. 
According to this view, parties are dominated by a top-down approach 
that allows the elite to free itself from the grassroots activists and talk 
directly to their constituencies, spreading political messages through 
common channels of communication. The vision that is emerging is 
composed of political and media elites who, applying to each other, they 
leave out the mass of voters which is forced to build a political opinion 
only on the basis of their messages that are passed through the media.  
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Chapter four 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1  Think tanks’ discourse practices 
This final chapter aims to identify and evaluate think tanks’ strategies to 
have an impact on policy and government action in the United States 
through their more frequent communication practices. The change and the 
development of political communication will focus, in particular, on: 
a) kinds of communication and hybridization / evolution of genres  
b) the impact of new technologies 
c) the relationship between the features of discourse, its objectives and 
the role or function of recipients (members of parliament, party organs, 
printing, general public, etc..) 
Some of the most common mechanisms of communication are: 
• policy papers 
• op-eds 
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• reports 
• monographs 
• policy briefs 
• parliamentary papers 
• seminars and conferences 
• workshops and training 
• blueprints 
• journals 
• instant expertise 
We will analyse nine texts (between 784 and 5,755 words) written by 
Heritage experts from 2005 (the year in which the first version of the 
European Constitution was rejected in France and the Netherlands) to 2007 
(the year in which the Treaty of Lisbon was signed) and catalogued on the 
Heritage website as ‘research papers’. These papers belong to different 
genres of think-tank communication practices (webmemo, commentary, 
lecture and backgrounder), but basically share the same topics and 
assumptions: the ‘foolish’ attempt to build a European nation–state and its 
potential devastating effects on US geopolitical interests.  
The analysis will attempt to demonstrate:  
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a) how the neoconservative experts working for The Heritage Foundation 
ideologically frame the prospective European political integration 
constantly in relation to US geopolitical interests and not in itself;  
b) that this type of framing leads the Heritage experts to strategically 
deny European political identity and overemphasize the identities of the 
single European countries;  
c) how the focus on global and local issues is exploited by The Heritage 
Foundation to support an argumentative logic aiming to maintain the 
transatlantic power relations according to the status quo established after 
the Iraqi war in 2003 (Hassner/ Vaïsse 2003).  
 
 
List of selected articles 
 
1. ‘The Bush Administration Should Not Back the European 
Constitution’ (February 16, 2005) – genre: webmemo (word number: 
1080);  
2. ‘European Disunion’23
3. ‘Cataclysm: The Rejection of the European Constitution and What It 
Means for Transatlantic Relations’ (June 8, 2005) - genre: backgrounder 
(word number: 4,385);  
 (June 8, 2005) – genre: commentary (word 
number: 780); 
                                                 
23  This article appeared first in June 2005 in The Washington Times with the heading ‘Finding European 
identity – Politics unites, culture divides’. 
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4. ‘The Great EU Inquisition: Europe's Response to the U.S. Rendition 
Policy’ (February 6, 2006) – genre: webmemo (word number: 1,960); 
5. ‘The EU Constitution: Will Europe Force a Way Forward?’ 
(December 14, 2006) – genre: backgrounder (word number: 3,500); 
6. ‘Is the E.U. America's Friend or Foe?’ (December 22, 2006)24
7. ‘Sarkozy’s Victory and the Future of U.S.–French Relations’ (May 9, 
2007 ) – genre: webmemo (word number: 1,255); 
 – 
genre: lecture (word number: 4,470); 
8. ‘The New EU Reform Treaty: A Threat to the Special Relationship’ 
(July 6, 2007) – genre: webmemo (word number: 1,085); 
9. ‘The European Security and Defense Policy: A Challenge to the 
Transatlantic Security Alliance’ (July 18, 2007) – genre: backgrounder 
(word number: 5,500).25
 
 
Although the selected articles have a different structure, webmemos and 
backgrounders make up the major part of this small corpus and share the 
common purpose of informing researchers and visitors about neo-
conservative political visions, attitudes and initiatives.26
                                                 
24 This lecture is far from being an academic reflection. It was delivered by John Blundell, Director of the London-
based Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), one of the first and most influential conservative think-tanks in Europe. 
The lecture summarizes a longer document presented by John Blundell and Gerald Frost almost three years before at 
the 8th IEA Discussion Paper (January 26, 2004) with a very similar title: ‘Friend or Foe – What Americans Should 
Know About the European Union’. 
25 From now on, all the Heritage papers will be referred to by their relative number between square brackets, e.g.: [1], 
[2]. Emphasis will be added in italics.  
26  According to the Heritage experts, backgrounders “give researchers the in-depth information they need on a 
wide variety of key issues. Charts, graphs, and other visuals contained in these studies are also available to clarify the 
nuances of today's public policy debates”, whereas a webmemo “is an online exclusive analysis that supplies 
Heritage.org visitors with the information they need to follow fast-breaking policy developments” (see 
<www.heritage.org>).  
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Figure n. 3 – An example of Heritage Foundation backgrounder (document n.3) 
 
4.2. The Heritage Foundation  
 
The Heritage Foundation was chosen because it is probably the leading 
think-tank among the many conservative-oriented research centres in the 
USA. Its deep entrenchment within the Republican Party and governments 
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from Reagan’s two terms onwards27
However, a historical and deeper explanation lies in the nature of a 
think-tank like The Heritage Foundation, which belongs to what Hassner 
and Vaïsse (2003) call the ‘third wave’ of political lobbying in the US: the 
emergence of the advocacy think-tanks in the 70s.
 is the most apparent reason why we 
cannot help considering their documents as politically representative of the 
neo-conservative mindset.  
28
a conservative think tank with the ability to deliver cogent and useful information to 
key policy makers in a timely fashion. Because they [the men who created HF] were 
politically involved, they understood that ideas do matter if the ideas are available 
 As we said before, 
advocacy think-tanks are not simple research centres, because they do not 
aim to provide academic analyses, but try to implement an ideological 
program through ready-to-use documents and recommendations. Heritage 
papers are conceived as an operative tool in the hands of Republican 
congressmen: reports on relevant legislative issues are delivered to political 
representatives and their staff in the Congress daily and directly. 
It is not by chance that The Heritage Foundation building is only two 
blocks away from the Capitol Hill. In 1986, Ed Feulner Jr., President of 
The Heritage Foundation at that time, outlined the project and the role of a 
new type of think-tank like The Heritage Foundation, more committed to 
influencing decision-making than producing scholarly papers:  
 
                                                 
27  The latest speech delivered by the President G.W. Bush at the Heritage Foundation dates back to November 
2007 and was focused on foreign policy and war on terror. 
28  See Hassner/Vaïsse (2003) for a short historical account of lobbying groups in the USA after the Second 
World War. See also Abelson (1996) and Smith (1993).  
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when an issue is being debated, not weeks or months after the debate has ended and 
the decision has been made. (Feulner 1986) 
 
Ten years after that speech, James Ridgeway (1997), described quite 
realistically the type of daily exchange of political information taking place 
between Heritage experts and conservative staff at the Congress:  
 
The foundation has sixty analysts working on issues across the board. Michael Franc, 
the vice president who oversees government relations, goes back and forth to the Hill 
three or four times a day, briefing staffs of conservative members and meeting with 
members themselves. On the Hill, Heritage representatives will hand out 
backgrounders on a bill heading for the floor the following week. If a bill is in 
trouble, Franc may go back to headquarters and pull out an apt Op-Ed from The Wall 
Street Journal or produce a quick executive memo. A staffer who knows that his 
office is going to have to deal with a controversial bill comes to work and finds a 
short Heritage report on the subject in his in-box. He can quickly find out what's 
involved and pass it on to his boss to use in a floor statement or in answering letters 
from constituents (Ridgeway 1997). 29
Indeed, the Heritage Foundation, according to the intentions of its main 
founders, William Scaife Mellon, known as the “Financial Father of 
American Right”, and Joseph Coors, a beer magnate, was definitely set up 
to wage and win what Ed Feulner (1986) called a ‘war of ideas’ or a ‘war 
of words’. The ideological and linguistic implications behind this approach 
are obvious: what is at stake is not only an intellectual supremacy or a 
 
 
                                                 
29 James Ridgeway’s article was published in The National Magazine on 22 December 1997 and was 
entitled “Heritage on the hill. The Right’s preeminent PR machine”, available from 
http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Media/Heritage_Hill.html  
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long-term cultural hegemony, but the ability to provide and support 
Republican representatives with well-shaped arguments and updated 
information ready to be used during parliamentary debates.  
The instrumental nature of Heritage works proved to be extremely 
successful during Reagan’s first electoral campaign and his consecutive 
governments from 1980 to 1988. The Heritage competitive approach to 
politics, where you have winners and losers and you can ‘market your 
ideas’ according to a ‘marketing strategy’ to change the focus of the public 
debate, influence the public opinion or even shape up the ‘end products’, 
i.e. laws, (see Feulner 1986), had a first stunning effect with the publication 
of the first version of the one thousand page political handbook for 
conservatives Mandate for Leadership, published by the Heritage 
Foundation in 1980. Especially during his first term, Reagan  
 
used ‘Mandate’ to help realize his vision of a world free of communism, an economy 
that didn’t crush people’s dreams with high taxes and regulations, and an America 
the world could admire once again. He gave copies to every member of his Cabinet. 
The result: Nearly two-thirds of ‘Mandate’s’ 2,000 recommendations were adopted 
or attempted by the Reagan administration. (Blasko 2004) 
 
 
4.3 Constructing the enemy  
 
The logical and rhetorical patterns which were so common in 
conservative papers (see Medhurst et al. 1997) during the Cold War time 
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were exploited again by the Heritage experts dealing with the case of 
European Constitution. The Heritage Foundation experts were very keen on 
pointing out the drawbacks to US military interests deriving from European 
political integration. All the articles selected for the present analysis 
construct quite a consistent neo-conservative vision of transatlantic 
relations. The articles seem to have been written by the same author, as 
they all share some discourse features that we will try to highlight.  
The main and common conceptual element is the ‘logic of confrontation’ 
(Medhurst et al. 1997: 72), which once opposed the USA to the Communist 
menace and today picks out elsewhere in the world other suitable enemies 
to go against in the name of freedom and democracy. This basically moral 
vision of international relations (Hassner/Vaïsse 2003; Lakoff 1995) is 
based on the constant need to find an external antagonist that represents a 
challenge to the principles and values of American people. This is the most 
common approach of conservatives to foreign policy: the opponent can be 
equivalent to a political group, a person, a state, even a religion that the 
neo-conservative discourse portrays, de-legitimates and fights.  
After 9/11, two well-known moral labels exploited by George W. Bush 
were ‘rogue states’ and ‘axis of evil’ (State of the Union Address 2002), 
which show how the conservative political and linguistic strategy has been 
geared to meet the needs of the post-Cold war time. Golub (2003) provides 
a historical and political explanation of the passage from Cold war to the 
doctrine of preemption (see also Kristol/Kaplan 2003: 79):  
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Mais, simultanément, la chute de l’URSS faisait disparaître la raison d’être de l’Etat 
de sécurité nationale, dissolvant le sens que seul procure un ennemi mortel. Comme 
l’écrivent deux chercheurs nord-américains [Havers-Wexler 2001], “on aurait pu 
penser que les néoconservateurs se seraient réjouis de la mort de leur ennemi”. Ce ne 
fut pas exactement le cas. Hantés par le spectre de la démobilisation nationale et 
“préoccupés avant tout par la légitimité politique et culturelle du régime américain”, 
ils recherchèrent un nouveau “démon [...] capable d’unifier et d’inspirer le peuple 
[...]. Un ennemi à combattre qui rappellerait à ce dernier le sens et la vulnérabilité de 
sa culture et de sa société” (Golub 2003: 17). 
 
The struggle for ideological hegemony that is shown throughout our 
Heritage Foundation corpus benefits from a theoretical approach such as 
Critical Discourse Analysis (hence CDA), which attempts to investigate 
power relations among political and social forces. Since its beginnings, 
CDA has pointed out how language choices and ideological stances are 
intertwined (Hodge/Kress 1979). Van Dijk (2001) pays much attention to 
describing how ideological systems work through language and its 
rhetorical devices. His theoretical assumption is based on the concept of 
ideology as system of beliefs essential for the social construction of a 
group, rather than simply being an “unstructured list of ideas” (Van Dijk 
2001: 13): 
Cognitively, as we said before, ideologies are a form of self-schema of 
(the members of) groups, that is, a representation of themselves as a group, 
especially also in relation to other groups. Processes of social identification 
ultimately take place on the shared social representations we call 
ideologies. The social inspiration for a theory of ideological structure 
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therefore must be sought in the basic properties of (social) groupness, of 
which the following ones have particular relevance:  
1. Membership devices (gender, ethnicity, appearance, origin, etc.): Who 
are we?  
2. Actions: What do we do?  
3. Aims: Why do we do this?  
4. Norms and Values: What is good or bad?  
5. Position: What is our position in society, and how do we relate to 
other groups? 
6. Resources: What is ours? What do we want to have/keep at all costs?  
(Van Dijk 2001: 14) 
 
On these grounds, we can trace a relational network throughout our 
corpus, in which the identities of three participants emerge:  
a) the opponent, the European Union – its Constitution and its political 
class – which is the negative actor, as it actually represents the menace 
posed to the USA’s dominant international role;  
b) the beneficiary, which in our case is embodied by the European 
citizens who are represented as against European Union and can therefore 
be the target of America’s action to restore freedom and democracy;  
c) the hero, the United States, saviour of the oppressed European people, 
whose task is to face the threat and actively cooperate with single European 
nation–states through its conservative congressmen.  
The main contrast is between the biased identification of US and THEM, 
that is to say between the USA, champion and defender of democratic 
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values, and the Europe emerging from the constitutional process, labelled 
as an institution working against democratic principles. In all the articles 
the authors acknowledge a threat which the European Constitution poses to 
US power and the maintenance of geopolitical status quo. The European 
Union as a military and political single power would subvert this status.  
The present analysis will try to single out this basic discursive strategy, 
without going into more specific and punctual details (passives, 
nominalizations, syntactic layouts etc.). We will isolate the textual portions 
which illustrate this strategy and the most apparent semantic and 
conceptual tokens that fulfil the political objective of maintaining the status 
quo in terms of the current global power relations, i.e. the political and 
military subordination of the European Union to the United States.  
 
 
4.4  European Union, the new threat 
 
The idea of threat or menace was a leitmotif of Cold War rhetoric. The 
Reagan administration drew upon a variety of terms that categorized the 
Communist enemy as a destroying force of a savage nature. They talked 
about Soviets as if they were “snakes, wolves and other kinds of dangerous 
predators [...] primitives, brutes, barbarians, mindless machines, criminals, 
lunatics, fanatics and enemies of God” (Ivie 1997: 74).  
The European Union does not deserve the same treatment, but is 
nonetheless portrayed as a threat. The European Union represents a 
political, rather than a cultural threat. Such image is mainly conveyed 
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through the use of phrases portraying the European Union as a menacing 
giant, inevitably acting as an opponent to the USA. The geopolitical 
situation is seen in a realist political perspective, definitely consistent with 
a neoconservative approach, where the utmost interests concentrate in the 
US military power and diplomatic relations:  
 
(1) E.U. now has a population more than 50 percent larger than that of 
the United States.[6] 
 
(2) The United States needs to recognize the threat posed by Brussels’ 
drive to centralize huge swathes of public policy as having significant 
negative implications for America and respond to that threat by applying 
appropriate diplomatic pressure to ensure that U.S. interests are upheld 
within the transatlantic alliance.[2]  
 
When explicitly mentioned, the word threat is always related to US 
interests or, sometimes, to American interests and American values. In 
these cases, the nationalist pride is more effectively brought into play by 
using the modifier American, rather than U.S.: 
 
(3) the increasing political centralization of Europe poses a fundamental 
threat to U.S. interests.[4] 
 
(4) The New EU Reform Treaty: A Threat to the Special Relationship. 
[8] 
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(5) Another insidious long-term threat to American values is posed by 
Part II of the draft European constitution, the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights. [5] 
 
(6) However, the re-emergence of the draft EU constitution represents a 
fundamental threat to American interests far more profound than the 
hostility of any one European leader. [1]  
 
Some authors implicitly introduce the idea of a threat using expressions 
which refer to an alleged plot against the USA. In such cases, the selected 
formulations all undermine the well established American pride:  
 
(7) On the other hand, the French have long coveted a European defense 
identity specifically to counter American global power. Through a 
supranational foray into foreign policy areas such as military operations, 
the ESDP became Chirac's latest ruse to rival America. [9] 
 
(8) [European officials] are engaged in a campaign of pandering and 
grandstanding to delegitimise U.S. counter-terrorism effort [4] 
 
(9) [the Council’s Rapporteur] report it is filled with conjecture, 
innuendo, and a barely disguised sneering contempt for the U.S. approach 
to the war on terrorism. [4] 
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(10) Finally, the United States should also be wary of French 
President Nicolas Sarkozy's insistence on removing the EU's policy 
commitment to free and undistorted competition. [8] 
 
However, the idea of an impending danger acquires more strength when 
the break of the current transatlantic relations is seen in the future and the 
current threat is likely to become a global power:  
 
(11) America would be forced to negotiate with a single European 
power instead of forming ad hoc coalitions with sovereign nation-states and 
traditional allies. [5] 
 
In this view, the USA would then be obliged to deal with a different and 
more powerful geopolitical player. The geopolitical world order envisaged 
by Kristol and Kaplan (2003), unilaterally protected by an American 
superpower, could actually be threatened by the emergence of a great 
Europe.  
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4.5 The denied identity of the United Europe 
 
The discourse strategy used to exorcise the European enemy is, in the 
first place, the denial of the other’s emerging identity. The target, therefore, 
is necessarily an institutional one, since it is the one which is deemed 
responsible for the attempt of restructuring the current transatlantic 
relations. This is achieved by the use of three recurrent series of 
representations:  
a) the old and unrepresentative European political class, identified as 
distant and disregarding people’s will;  
b) the European Constitution, mainly described through the metaphorical 
imagery of death;  
c) the fundamental cultural multiplicity of European nations, pointing out 
an intrinsic political diversity which is counterbalanced by American unity. 
 
When referring to the political class and the EU Constitution, many 
authors try to represent it as a political body made up of very few members 
embedded in a political framework more similar to an aristocratic system 
than a democratic one. This semantic cluster revolves mainly around the 
image of the élite:  
 
(12) the continental elite has […] lost political touch with its people [3] 
 
(13) unrepresentative political elites [6] 
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(14) the continent’s tired elite [3] 
 
(15) Like the old Bourbon kings of France [3] 
 
(16) For Europe's elites, the constitution is anything but dead. [5] 
 
(17) [The Constitution] enshrines modish and ephemeral values as 
supreme law for 25 separate nation-states with the intention of fully 
globalizing its lofty and elite-driven policies. [5] 
 
The symbolic flaw is made more concrete by a political distance between 
the European governing institutions and the citizens. European politicians 
and institutions are not elected by people:  
 
(18) Any attempt to force consensus in Europe, which the 
Constitution would undoubtedly do, would be inherently undemocratic, 
counter-productive, and artificial. [3] 
 
(19) the unelected European Court of Justice [3] 
 
(20) unelected, and largely unaccountable salariat [6] 
 
(21) anti-democratic removal of sovereignty [6] 
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If European governing institutions stem from an undemocratic political 
system, the failure of their ambitious achievement, the Constitution, is 
metaphorically turned into a thin object:  
 
(22) the fragility of this political project [6]  
 
or, more powerfully, into an object placed onto the vertical axis and 
falling towards the bottom:30
                                                 
30  In these cases, the basic metaphoric concept is mapped onto space dimensions and draws on the opposition 
up is good vs. down is bad (Lakoff/Johnson 1980).  
 
 
(23) It [the EU constitution] has hit the ground with a well-
deserved thud [3] 
 
(24) the vision of the EU as an international counterweight to the 
United States fortunately has foundered [2] 
 
In other articles, the metaphorical mapping goes even further and 
connects the rejected Constitution in France and the Netherlands with the 
anthropomorphic image of a dead body:  
 
(25) the Constitutional ratification process is dead in the water [2] 
 
(26) Outside of Europe, the EU constitution is widely assumed to 
be dead [5] 
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(27) Europe's powerful Franco-German axis has taken on the 
mantle of resuscitating the constitution. [5] 
 
(28) the governments of Denmark, Finland, and Luxembourg have 
all come out in vocal support of reviving the draft constitution. [5] 
 
The emphasis on European dis-union, however, is also worth being 
observed. The most striking attack on European identity is made by the use 
of noun- and verbal phrases indicating disunion and absence. The European 
denied identity is mainly conveyed by reiterating negations or statements 
underlining political disagreement, cultural differences, diversity, and 
disparity:  
 
(29) different languages and cultures [6] 
 
(30) this problem is compounded by the lack of a common 
language [6] 
 
(31) The EU has not even been able to come up with the words to a 
European anthem, as no one could agree which language the text should be 
[2] 
 
Along the same line, other statements simply take for granted European 
cultural variety and multiplicity providing no explanations:  
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(32) Europe is divided, not united [1] 
 
(33) there is widespread disagreement within Europe [2]  
 
(34) In a Europe of diversity, it would seem that […]. [3] 
 
(35) The constitution was purposely vague so as to hide significant 
differences of political opinion [3] 
 
(36) growing technological disparity and the unbridgeable political 
schisms within Europe […]. [3] 
 
(37) economic, sociological, military, and political diversity in 
Europe [3] 
 
(38) Europe does not have a common people, nor does it have 
common bonds of allegiance and obligation [6] 
 
(39) there is, of course, no such thing as a European people or 
European nation [6] 
 
As we have seen, besides ensuring they are sufficiently clear about the 
‘death’ of the European constitution, a further strategy is to emphasize the 
European ‘disunion’. Here again the aim is twofold. On the one hand, 
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emphasising the many political and cultural differences confirms even 
further the non-identity of Europe; on the other hand, the authors implicitly 
compare a dis-united Europe with the United States of America.  
 
 
4.6  The Europeans, or the recognized identity 
 
Having identified the ‘enemy’ and, at the same time, denied its identity, 
the Heritage experts are ready to recognize some sort of European identity. 
It seems contradictory to recognize an identity to an entity who has been 
the target of bitter criticism. However, all the authors of our corpus use 
similar discourse devices supporting a same argumentative strategy: if the 
Europe of the institutions is de-legitimised, the actual European citizens 
come into play as actors or, more precisely, as personas. In this process, 
the participants – no longer opponents – are referred to as the British, the 
Dutch, the French, the Scandinavians, Europeans, people, peoples, 
citizens:  
 
(40) Many other EU members – the Central and East Europeans, 
the British, the Dutch and the Scandinavians – do not want their 
relationship with the United States constantly jeopardized. [2] 
 
(41) French and Dutch citizens chose to vote no for many disparate 
reasons [3] 
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Personas
Peoples 
4
People 
24
citizen/s 
12
Europeans 
10
(42) The Dutch are generally pro-American [3] 
 
(43) the French and Dutch rejected the proposed text in referenda 
[3] 
 
(44) The French people seemingly understand that their country 
faces a stark choice on its future and opted for an openly pro-American 
reformer. [7] 
 
These participants receive their national identity and, at the same time, 
share the same values as the Americans, basically rejecting the European 
Union, its Constitution and its political élite. The use of some of the most 
frequent labels, which provide Europeans with these national and civic 
identities, is quantified in Figure n. 2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure n.2.-  Number of occurrences of the words people(s), Europeans, citizen(s). 
 
If we examine the word Europeans, we find that it is sometimes 
associated with a passive role (because oppressed by European leaders): 
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(45) the notion of ever closer union is a utopian idea whose time 
will never come. All Americans and Europeans who believe in the 
transatlantic relationship should be glad for this rude awakening, as it 
allows things to proceed in a more realistic manner. [3] 
 
(46) The common denominator in all these instances of systemic 
failure is that Europeans feel powerless, whether the questions are political 
or economic. [3] 
 
(47) the ambition to create a unitary European state as a 
countervailing force to the United States […] continues to the detriment of 
the economic and security interests of both North Americans and 
Europeans. [6] 
 
This is contrasted with an active role, in which Europeans show a sort of 
willingness which does not match the political project promoted by 
European institutions. The following examples show the necessity to allow 
European citizens to have their say, as happened in France and the 
Netherlands:  
 
(48) What Europe’s leaders should do now, after the cataclysms of 
the French and Dutch referendums, is to take a deep breath and ask 
ordinary Europeans what kind of future they really want, in positive terms. 
[2] 
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(49) the United States should make it clear both that it respects the 
right of Europeans to decide the ultimate form of political association that 
the various states wish to have with one another. [3] 
 
(50) The United States should move quickly to support Europeans 
everywhere who wish to retake control of their political, military, and 
economic destiny. [3] 
 
 
4.7. Global vs. local  
 
The discoursal practice of denying and recognizing identities has the 
strategic purpose of maintaining the status quo, neutralizing a single global 
rival so as to deal with individual states. Most of the examples quoted 
below describe an action – work, cooperate, engage – which positions the 
main participant, the USA – the hero – in an active and operative role. The 
USA is identified through the influence of its institutions, mainly 
diplomatic bodies that represent a democracy and so are allowed to carry 
out political actions on a global scale. The addressees of this sort of 
performative identity are not the European citizens but member-states, 
nations, partners, allies, countries. The U.S. act to the benefit of the single 
European state identities:  
  
(52) [….] the United States should continue to work closely with 
the governments of individual European states [4] 
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(53) […] cooperate effectively with individual European nation-
states [4] 
 
(54) America must therefore shore up its bilateral relations with 
these [Poland and Czech Republic] countries and encourage them to pursue 
security and defense agendas that are commensurate with the aims of the 
transatlantic alliance and their own broader strategic interests [9] 
 
(55) welcomes working with European countries on an issue-by-
issue, case-by-case basis. [3] 
 
(56) to work closely with its plentiful allies in Europe with which it 
shares common strategic interests [5] 
 
(57) [will deal] with individual allies to build ad hoc coalitions [5] 
 
(58) [….] needs to signal its willingness to work with multiple 
partners on a variety of stages and resist the “speak with one voice” 
approach [5] 
 
(59) Friendly relations with individual EU member states must be 
the highest priority for America’s vast diplomatic service [5] 
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(60) […] a Europe where national sovereignty remains paramount 
regarding foreign and security policy and where states act flexibly rather 
than collectively whenever possible will enable America to engage the 
continent most successfully. [1] 
 
The above examples show how identity is granted to those Europeans 
who acknowledge the European disunion and the negative consequences of 
a single oppressing Europe, and consequently claim the right to act 
individually. By focusing its attention on single states, the USA can 
establish privileged, individualised relationships which will ultimately 
allow them to maintain the role of unique geopolitical power. Interestingly, 
this dìvide et ìmpera strategy is a clear countermeasure to the alleged plot 
of the European super-state to subdue the USA. Here, the ‘going local’ 
tendency is evident in all the expressions where the second participant is 
identified by the adjective individual. Equally, the encouragement to 
fragment is stressed by words such as bilateral, flexibly, issue-by-issue, 
case-by-case. The political identity of the European Union is denied in 
order to neutralize the danger of a potential global competitor, therefore 
pictured as the main cause of transatlantic disagreement. On the other hand, 
single national identities of European citizens and member-states are 
recognised since they are evidently less powerful and dangerous for US 
supremacy at an international level. 
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Conclusion  
 
 
 
 
 
It is not easy to assess the impact of think tanks in the USA: on both 
sides of the political spectrum, it seems that the main drive behind think 
tanks’ action and initiatives is competition. It is not by chance that one of 
the most prominent leader of a think tank, Ed Feulner, ‘framed’ political 
rivalry and challenge as a war – a war of ideas, a war of words. U.S think 
tanks seem to adapt their intellectual efforts to beat the enemy, not to 
strengthen the democratic debate among social parties.  
Mass media still allow the manipulation of consensus. Political ideas are 
spread and exchanged as if they were products to buy and sell: the 
evolution of think tanks over the last fifty years (chapter one) proves that 
the process of commodification of public life has been extended to politics 
too. People can buy products for their households – bread, soap, Coca –cola 
– as well as ideas. The same advertising and marketing strategies can be 
exploited, so that politics is able to provide what voters want in that 
moment, not what is best for them on the long-term.  
A neutral notion of ideology, as we sketched in the second chapter, 
seems to be more appropriate to the purposes of the social researcher. 
Ideology, seen as a form of self-schema of (the members of) groups, that is 
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a representation of themselves as a group in relation to other groups (Van 
Dijk 2001), is a more agile concept than the traditional marxist principle of 
ideology as false consciousness. The interpretation and understanding of 
the structure of ideology, rather their validity or ‘truth’, helps social 
scientists discover how ideologies work and how they exploit linguistic 
resources. As a matter of fact, thanks to this theoretical background, we 
were able to observe and investigate (chapters three and four) what lies 
behind neo-conservative discourse and their relationship with mass media 
and how language is, too often, functional to political purposes. 
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